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SUMMARY 
The aim of this study is to investigate the future risks to supply for the global markets 
for oil, coal and uranium.  The study forms part of an integrated project by the CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, which is developing a framework 
for a cost benefit analysis of energy supply security policy. This study is divided into 
four sections. The first section deals with the issues and definitions that relate to the 
meaning of security of supply. The following three sections deal in turn with the risks 
to future supply for oil, coal and uranium.  
 
The analysis has examined the impact that supply disruptions have had in the past, the 
events that have disturbed energy supply and the affect that they have had on prices, 
on the economy and on society. For each commodity we have analysed the political, 
economic, institutional and technical risks and have qualitatively assessed the impact 
that each might have on the two price scenarios provided by the CPB. We also discuss 
the policy responses that governments have adopted in the aftermath of supply 
disruptions. 
 
The report commences with a discussion of the definition of security of supply and 
the link to the potential for supply disruptions. The analysis shows that the political 
concept of ‘security’ applied to supply does not cover all cases of significant price 
rises.  Security seems to refer more particularly to situations free from physical 
interruptions of production or distribution due either to political factors and events or 
to accidents.  Security is a matter of probability: the greater the chances of these 
accidents or events occurring the weaker the security.  But price rises may occur 
because of depletion, miscalculations about the rate of investment required, flawed 
policies, shifts in demand and a host of other causes.  One need therefore to consider 
the issue in a broader framework than primarily suggested by the term ‘security’ 
unless it’s meaning is stretched so wide that it becomes both all-embracing and devoid 
of analytical power. It is for this reason that in this study we have examined the issue 
of supply disruptions in the context of economic, technical, institutional and political 
factors. 
 
Our conclusions for the potential for supply disruptions for oil show that in the short 
term under both the ‘High Growth’ and ‘Low Growth’ scenarios, the most probable   3 
disturbance that may occur in the near future will be due to a war in Iraq.  The 
immediate impact will be a loss of 2 million b/d of Iraqi oil in the world petroleum 
market.  Should Iraq succeed in retaliating on oil installations in Saudi Arabia or 
Kuwait (probability 10 per cent) oil prices will quickly rise to the $40 per barrel level.  
If major damage is caused to these installations prices may well move higher, that is 
close to $45 or $50 per barrel and depending on the damage the duration of the price 
rise will be of the order of several months.  If Iraq fails to attack its neighbours, the 
military operation ends quickly and Saddam Hussein does not set the oil wells on fire, 
oil prices will quickly fall from the current $25 per barrel level to $20 or even $18 
d/b. Under both the ‘Low Growth’ and ‘High Growth’ scenarios, terrorist action 
against oil instillations or tankers is possible (probability 30 per cent for oil fields, 60 
per cent for pipelines, tankers and other isolated plants) but the probability of major 
disruptions is low (less than 5 per cent). 
 
In the medium term the potential for supply disruptions to oil under both the ‘Low 
Growth’ and ‘High Growth’ scenarios, include the probability of a crisis in Saudi 
Arabia and indeed in other major Gulf countries (including Iran) increases with the 
passage of time.  But the period from 2005 to 2010 is one during which additional 
supplies may be reaching the market from the Caspian, the West African offshore and 
perhaps from a pacified Iraq.  Russian output would have built up in the immediately 
preceding years.  While the probability of a crisis increases the magnitude of the 
impact on prices may be mitigated by the increase in supply. Terrorism will continue 
to represent a threat (similar probability as for the short term) but the risk of serious 
damage is likely to diminish because of improved security measures.  
 
In the medium term, however, certain  political forces relating to human rights, 
environmental issues, or an anti-corruption drive may have gained momentum.  Other 
things being equal these may restrict investments in capacity and restrict supplies.  
Economic difficulties in certain countries,  not only in Latin America, Africa or 
Indonesia but also in Russia or the Caspian could restrict investment.  The overall 
supply situation will thus depend on the magnitude of the positive shifts due to new 
capacity compared with the negative shifts due to  insufficient investment in new 
capacity or in workovers needed to fight natural decline in old fields. 
   4 
Our view of the medium-term is one of fairly weak oil prices with the possibility of a 
price spike resulting from a political incident in Saudi Arabia.  During that incident 
whose probability is in the order of 20-25 per cent prices could well climb to $50 per 
barrel. The risk of a political incident in Saudi Arabia is more likely under the ‘Low 
Growth’ scenario, which envisages flat real oil prices 
 
The  very long-term problem is one of oil depletion and the rate at which fuel 
substitutes and new fuel-using types of engines are developed and enter the market.  
But this is a problem that will begin to be felt around 2020 or a bit later.  The period 
between  2015 and 2020 or 2025 could witness the beginnings of a tighter supply 
situation because the big increases from Iraq, Russia, West Africa and Venezuela 
would have occurred in earlier years.  Oil prices will then rise and stimulate R & D 
substitutes, actual substitution and reduction in demand.  In other words this would be 
a period leading to major adjustments in the longer term (2025 – 2040). The risk of 
supply disruption in the longer term due to depletion is much more likely under the 
‘High Growth’ scenario than under the ‘Low Growth’ scenario. 
 
With regards to the policy response to disruptions of oil supply, our view is that 
governments are always inclined to favour fiscal policies as a means to limit the 
demand for oil and, other things being equal, to reduce imports. The first reaction to a 
crisis is therefore likely to be an increase in excise taxes on automotive fuels. This is 
preferred to subsidies to alternative fuels or research and development since taxes 
bring in revenues whereas subsidies are an expense. There are instances, however, 
where encouraging new supplies may be more effective than discouraging demand. 
 
Coal still makes a significant contribution to primary energy demand and is at present 
only exceeded by oil. Although coal reserves are vast and are widely dispersed, 
consumption is increasingly concentrating in a small number of countries and in a few 
main uses.  Nearly two-thirds of total world coal consumption is accounted for in just 
four countries namely China, United States, India and Russia. However, the volume 
of remaining reserves remains high with OECD countries accounting for over 60 per 
cent of exporting countries. In addition, the USA is expected to remain the swing 
producer for coal in the longer-term. As a result, concerns over coal supply security   5 
are likely to remain minimal especially as almost half of current reserves are located 
in OECD countries. 
 
The key potential supply disturbance that we have identified relates to environmental 
pressure and the impact that this could have on demand. Coal is particularly 
vulnerable as it contributes 38 per cent of the world’s total carbon emissions from 
commercial fuels, and is also a major source of sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides 
emissions as well as particulates and other environmental hazards. The greater the 
environmental pressure on the industry the greater the likelihood that this could lead 
to downward pressure on prices in the medium-term. In the longer-term this could 
affect investment decisions and put upward pressure on prices. However, this upward 
pressure could be fully mitigated by improvements in technology, the constant 
pressure to reduce costs combined with the vast resource base available. 
 
With regards to uranium, current demand can be met by primary production and by 
secondary sources from stockpiles and inventories. The uranium resource base is large 
enough to support even the most optimistic of demand assumptions and the reserves 
are located mainly in OECD countries. In the near-term, primary and secondary 
uranium resources will be able to meet both optimistic and pessimistic demand 
forecasts. In the medium-term, secondary sources will be depleted but current 
production and current developments of primary uranium should be sufficient to 
supply both optimistic and pessimistic demand forecasts. In the long-term, significant 
new sources of uranium will need to be developed to meet rising demand. This will 
require significantly higher prices to justify new investment.  
 
In the near term, the real risks to supply could come from disruptions in secondary 
supplies of uranium. Such disruptions are likely to be short-lived and cause spikes in 
the uranium price. In the longer term, economic factors are more likely to cause 
supply disruptions if prices do not recover to levels that justify new investment 
decisions. However, political factors and the introduction of new technology could 
suppress demand for uranium if the nuclear industry goes into decline.    6 
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1. PROJECT OUTLINE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the future risks to supply for the global markets 
for oil, coal and uranium.  The study forms part of an integrated project by the CPB 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, which is developing a framework 
for a cost benefit analysis of energy supply security policy.  
 
This study is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the i ssues and 
definitions that relate to the meaning of security of supply. The following three 
sections deal in turn with the risks to future supply for oil, coal and uranium.  
 
The analysis has examined the impact that supply disruptions have had in the past, the 
events that have disturbed energy supply and the affect that they have had on prices, 
on the economy and on society. For each commodity we have analysed the political, 
economic, institutional and technical risks and have qualitatively assessed the impact 
that each might have on the two price scenarios provided by the CPB. We also discuss 
the policy responses that governments have adopted in the aftermath of supply 
disruptions. 
 
The CPB provided two scenarios named ‘low growth’ and ‘high growth’. The 
scenario period stretches out fifty years with the short term defined as within 5 years, 
medium term within 20 years and long term within 50 years. The ‘high growth’ 
scenario assumes a highly integrated world economy unhindered by environmental 
and social policies. In contrast, the ‘low growth’ scenario is more regionalised, with 
intensive international environmental policies and significant local problems. In 
essence the difference between the two lies in the degree of globalisation. 
 
The CPB provided price scenarios for each scenario. In the ‘high growth’ scenario the 
demand for oil is assumed to be around 2 per cent per annum, high relative to historic 
rates. The high rate of growth is aimed at establishing whether the resource base is 
capable of meeting such ambitious targets. In any event, this scenario is considered to 
be a high price scenario as far as oil is concerned as it is assumed that oil will become 
scarce toward the end of the scenario period. The CPB estimate that under this 
scenario the price of oil will rise to $40 per barrel in real terms ($60 per barrel in   8 
nominal terms) because of scarcity, monopoly rents accruing to supply countries and 
higher costs. Given the ample supplies of world coal in a diverse number of countries 
the CPB estimates that coal prices will remain constant or show only a small increase 
in real terms. The CPB did not provide any estimate for the future price of uranium. 
 
In the ‘low growth’ scenario demand for oil and coal is assumed to increase slowly 
because of the low GDP growth. An increase in demand for oil of just 1 per cent per 
annum implies that production will peak no sooner than 2050. It is also assumed that 
although investment in production and transportation will be limited, demand can be 
easily met and as a consequence prices for oil will be subdued. Under this scenario the 
CPB assumes that real oil prices will show a downward trend towards 2040 reaching a 
level of $17 in 2040. It is also assumed that real coal prices will also fall. The CPB 
did not provide any forecasts for the price of uranium. 
 
Using both of these scenarios, OIES analysed the resource base for oil, coal and 
uranium. It was then decided to examine whether these resource bases would be 
capable of meeting the demand forecasts under both the CPB  scenarios. Once this 
analysis had been completed, OIES examined the political, economic, institutional 
and technical factors that could affect supply, in the short, medium and long term. 
Using this qualitative analysis, estimates were made of the risk to supply disruptions 
and from this estimates were made of the potential impact that they might have on the 
‘low growth’ and ‘high growth’ price scenarios. For each commodity the policy 
responses for each supply disruption are discussed. 
 
The study has been written in four self-contained parts. Therefore it is possible to read 
the whole section on the potential for supply disruptions to oil without reference to the 
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2. SECURITY OF SUPPLY DEFINITIONS 
 
How to define ‘security of supply’?  To economists, supply is the schedule of 
quantities that will be on offer at different prices.  Given the demand curve for a good, 
commodity or service the smaller the quantity on offer, the higher will be the price.  
Economists rarely talk about ‘security’ a concept that to them seems to belong to 
other disciplines such as politics or psychology.  In fact, some of them will go as far 
as denying that there are supply problems that the market cannot solve.  In a free 
market price will ration the quantity available among consumers.  They would argue 
that queues and visible physical shortage only appear when governments attempt to 
intervene with the market by fixing prices below the market clearing level or by 
introducing quantitative rationing. 
 
For the ordinary consumer the perspective is different however.  Ideally a consumer 
wishes to find the good, commodity or service he/she desires to purchase available at 
any time, in every accessible market, and at an ‘affordable’ price.  Supply is about 
quantity and price.  Availability is the quantitative aspect, affordability a characteristic 
of price relative to the wealth, income and other demand preferences of the consumer.  
There are cases, rare as they may be, when a good, commodity or service is just not 
on offer in a market.  I would like to eat custard apples but no greengrocer happens to 
stock them.  In these instances all potential consumers of custard apples will be 
frustrated.  In all other instances when an item is indeed available at a given price the 
set of potential consumers willing to pay this price will be satisfied and the set of 
those who judge the price too high given their means and other preferences will be 
frustrated.  Put more concisely, in most situations scarcity is a relative concept. 
 
For governments and more generally politicians, security refers to stable situations 
(‘business as usual’ in the jargon of business schools), which are judged on the basis 
of some criteria to be broadly satisfactory although never near perfect.  Security is 
threatened by any event or force that renders the situation unstable. 
 
These different perspectives can be reconciled to some extent.  When the economist 
moves from micro- to macro-economics he/she will point to the impact that a price 
rise (though it clears a market) can have on macro variables such as inflation, the   10 
balance of payments or the rate of economic growth.  The significance of the impact 
depends however on the share of the good, commodity or service in question in 
national expenditures or in the import bill, on the strength of linkages in the 
input/output set of relationships and on whether a close substitute for the item affected 
by the price rise is immediately available or not.  Much depends on the elasticity of 
demand. 
 
The economist, therefore, will consider a large shift in the supply curve of a good, 
commodity or service affected by low demand elasticity as disruptive, because of the 
macro-economic impact. 
 
What to the economist is a shift causing prices to rise significantly will be perceived 
by governments and public opinion in general as a price  shock.  Although the 
approaches, or the terminologies, are different the perceptions of economist, 
politicians, the media and the ordinary citizen meet at this point. 
 
There is shock only when the supply shift is fairly sudden, the price rise significant 
and the commodity involved, as is the case for energy in general and gasoline in 
particular, has no immediate substitute.  The sudden supply shift may be due to a 
variety of causes such as an interruption of production, of lifting for export, or of 
internal distribution.  These sudden disruptions may be caused by political events 
(wars, revolution, terrorism), labour unrest (strikes), accidents due to fire, explosion 
or storms for example, or policy decisions by producers organized in a cartel. 
 
Because shocks are sudden they capture public imagination and media interest.  But 
since the real issue is one of supply shifts causing prices to rise, one needs to consider 
situations when the increase is substantial but occurs over a long period of time.  One 
may argue that a sudden price change is more disturbing than one of the same, or even 
greater, magnitude that occurs over a number of months or years simply because 
adjustments are essentially a matter of time. 
 
Supply shifts resulting in price rises over time may be due to a failure to invest at a 
rate that ensures output growth equivalent to demand growth; to gradual increases in   11 
the degree of cartelization or more precisely in the ability of a cartel to steer prices on 
a rising path; or in the case of an exhaustible resource to physical depletion. 
 
Price rises are not exclusively caused by shifts in supply.  Price is the outcome of an 
interaction between supply and demand.  One can imagine situations where the 
demand schedule shifts to the right against a fairly stable supply curve.  If the price 
elasticity of supply is low the demand shift could cause significant price increases.  
Consider for example a situation where substantial economic  growth in large 
countries such as China or India enables more and more people to own a car.  The 
demand for oil would increase significantly causing prices to rise if the supply 
schedule remains fixed, or if it shifts over a smaller distance than demand. 
 
The analysis shows that the political concept of ‘security’ applied to supply does not 
cover all cases of significant price rises.  Security seems to refer more particularly to 
situations free from physical interruptions of production or distribution due either to 
political factors and events or to accidents.  Security is a matter of probability: the 
greater the chances of these accidents or events occurring the weaker the security.  
But price rises may occur because of depletion, miscalculations about the rate of 
investment required, flawed policies, shifts in demand and a host of other causes.  One 
need therefore to consider the issue in a broader framework than primarily suggested 
by the term ‘security’ unless it’s meaning is stretched so wide that it becomes both all-
embracing and devoid of analytical power. 
 
We have argued that the issue is essentially one of price changes and their impact on 
the macro-economy, the consumer’s income and expenditure basket, and in the case 
of oil on the functioning of a wide range of services that constitute the structure of 
modern life. 
 
A new question arises here.  As commodity prices (and this is very relevant to oil) 
usually display volatility, and given that some of this volatility (when the commodity 
price is determined on futures markets and with the use of other derivative trading 
instruments) is due to other factors than the economic fundamentals, it may prove 
difficult on certain occasions to distinguish between a fluctuation and a price surge.  It 
is not sufficient to focus on the size of the price change because short-term volatility   12 
may involve movements of large magnitude.  Recall the oil price movements in 1998-
9 when we witnessed a fall from $18/barrel to $10/barrel, and then a rise to 
$30/barrel.  The duration of a price change is an important dimension.  But how can 
big changes that are reversed after a few months or a year by a movement of similar 
magnitude and opposite direction be explained. 
 
In the case of oil we do not always find discernible trends (in the sense of a sustained 
movement in a particular direction over long periods of time).  A more noticeable 
pattern is one of price episodes separated by discontinuities.  The peculiar features of 
this pattern are that (a) the episodes involve a normal level around which prices 
fluctuate so that real average prices always fall during the episode; and (b) the 
discontinuities which separate episodes are of varying duration and take different 
forms: they may consist of a sudden shock or of a sequence of changes in opposite 
directions. 
 
In oil, we had the $2/barrel episode, which lasted from 1960 to 1969; a $10/barrel 
episode between the end of 1973 and the end of 1978; a $18/barrel episode from 1988 
to the end of 1997.  The discontinuities included the 1973/4 sudden rise; the ups and 
downs of 1979-86 and the ups and downs of 1998-9.  We may be now at the 
beginning of a new $23-25/barrel episode that started in 2001 or still in the midst of a 
long discontinuity prolonging the 1998-9 events. 
 
The points of time in this long pattern when the price of oil rose significantly because 
of a shift in the supply curve were in the years 1973 and 1979.  The shifts were partly 
due to political factors.  Price falls in the first half of the 1980s (which became 
significant in 1986) were due to a glut while the 1998 price fall had more to do with 
wrong information about production levels than actual output increases. 
 
The fundamental analytical problem about the price of oil is the difficulty of relating 
its movement to actual developments of supply and demand.  But the supply 
adjustments involve long lead-in time and demand for oil products in most countries 
(the USA is a notable exception) is more directly and strongly influenced by domestic 
taxation than international prices.   
   13 
Another difficulty relates to forecasting.  Forecasters looking at the years ahead 
usually show a trend line.  That this ignores short-term fluctuations does not constitute 
a problem.  That it fails to reflect the more realistic pattern of episodes and complex 
discontinuities is much more serious.  
i 
 
An oil supply disruption (a shock) or a gradual but significant shift in the 
supply/demand balance (a tightening) which causes its price to rise by a high 
percentage will have a more severe impact on a poor country with a high degree of oil 
import dependence than on a rich country with the same or a lower degree of 
dependence.  A wealthy individual faced with an increase in the price of gasoline may 
continue to drive his/her gas guzzling cars while a much poorer citizen may have to 
reduce drastically his use of the car and have greater recourse to public transport or 
the bicycle.  The issue is that what may be construed as a shock or a significant 
change by some may be of no great importance to others. 
 
The energy system may not have identical characteristics in different countries.  Some 
enjoy greater flexibility in switching from one fuel to another, particularly in power 
generation, than others. 
 
And in the case of a politically induced supply disruption (a war or a revolution in a 
major exporting country) the oil importing countries with entitlements to suppliers 
from an international energy arrangement will suffer less (other things being equal) 
than countries not covered by the safety net. 
 
All changes in an economic variable induce sequences of adjustments.  Adjustments 
involve time but the lags are of very different duration.  They also involve costs.  
Commentators inclined to minimize the significance of crises by arguing that 
economies and individuals always adjust in the end sometimes forget this.  This is true 
in most cases.  One should recall that in most cases, once again, costs are incurred.  A 
charge, which elicits smooth, painless and costless adjustments, is not a significant 
event; it cannot be labelled a crisis.   14 
3. EXPLORATION OF FUTURE RISKS ON THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR 
OIL 
 
1. Summary  
The issue of supply security for the global market for oil has recently been given 
exaggerated importance by both the USA and the EU. Dependence on imports has 
always been a feature of a world where nations trade. However, the oil issue is 
complicated immensely by political factors, the emotions that some of them elicit and 
the memory of the 1973 embargo which hurt the pride of industrialised countries 
because they  were aggressed by developing nations. In this paper we attempt to 
disentangle the subjective elements from the positive factors that underlie the 
perceptions of risks.  
 
2. The Key Exporting Countries 
 
2.1 Oil Reserve Base 
The current supply situations in the 20 oil-exporting countries and the type of risks 
they may face are now provided in a series of tables. Table 1 shows the top 20 oil 
producers in 2001 who account for just over 70 per cent of world supply of oil and 
nearly 90 percent of remaining proven reserves. From Figure 1 it is possible to see 
that the major producing country is Saudi Arabia with Russia a close second.  
 
Most of the OPEC nations feature in the top ten producers. Although Norway and the 
United Kingdom feature in the top ten producing countries their current levels of 
production are disproportionate to the level of their remaining reserves. For example, 
the United Kingdom has reserves to production ratio (R/P ratio) of just 5.8 years 
compared to the United Arab Emirate’s ratio in excess of 100 years and yet it 
produces annually the same volume of oil. 
 
In Figure 2 we show the main exporting countries in 2001. This table shows that over 
50 per cent of world production is exported annually with the Middle East accounting 
for over 46 per cent of total world exports. Latin America and Africa accounted for 15 
per cent of world exports with Europe and Russia accounting for around 10 per cent 
each. On a country basis, Saudi Arabia is the leading exporter followed by Russia but   15 
Figure 1: Top 20 Oil Producers in 2001 
 














Share of world 
reserves
R/P ratio
1,000 b/d (%) 1,000 b/d billion bbls (%) Years
Saudi Arabia 8,768               11.8% 7,421              261.8 24.9% 85.0          
Russia 7,056 9.5% 4,600 48.6 4.6% 19.1          
Norway 3,414 4.6% 3,201 9.4 0.9% 7.8            
Iran 3,688 5.0% 2,557 89.7 8.5% 67.4          
Venezuela 3,418 4.6% 77.7 7.4% 63.5          
Nigeria 2,148 2.9% 2,927 24 2.3% 30.8          
United Arab Emirates 2,422 3.3% 2,139 97.8 9.3%        100+ 
Kuwait 2,142 2.9% 1,936 96.5 9.2%        100+ 
Iraq 2,414 3.2% 112.5 10.7%        100+ 
United Kingdom 2,503 3.4% 853 4.9 0.5% 5.6            
Mexico 3,560 4.8% 1,747 26.9 2.6% 21.7          
Canada 2,763 3.7% 822 6.6 0.6% 8.8            
Libya 1,425 1.9% 29.5 2.8% 57.3          
Algeria 1,563 2.1% 1,363 9.2 0.9% 17.6          
Oman 959 1.3% 5.5 0.5% 15.8          
Indonesia 1,410 1.9% 315 5 0.5% 10.1          
Qatar 783 1.1% 753 15.2 1.4% 55.5          
Kazakhstan 828 1.1% 673 8 0.8% 27.6          
Angola 731 1.0% 5.4 0.5% 20.3          
Colombia 627 0.8% 407 1.8 0.2% 7.7            
Sub-total 52,622 100% 936.0 89% n/a
World Total 74,482 100% 1,050 n/a 40.3  16 
Figure 2: World Crude Exports 2001 
 























North America 1,154 1,375 1,998 -624 530 1.4%
Latin America 5,061 2,132 1,474 658 5,719 14.7%
Western Europe 4,905 4,454 5,262 -808 4,097 10.5%
Eastern Europe & Russia 3,346 1,512 221 1,291 4,637 11.9%
Middle East 15,391 2,963 363 2,600 17,990 46.3%
Africa 5,262 1,194 447 746 6,008 15.5%
Asia & Oceania 2,215 2,870 5,191 -2,321 -106 -0.3%
Saudi Arabia 6,036 1,083 1,083 7,119 18.0% 1
Russia 3,344 1,247 10 1,237 4,581 11.6% 2
Norway 2,979 250 3,229 8.2% 3
Iran 2,446 308 308 2,754 7.0% 4
Venezuela 1,965 761 761 2,726 6.9% 5
United Arab Emirates 1,787 398 398 2,185 5.5% 6
Nigeria 2,098 46 13 33 2,131 5.4% 7
Kuwait 1,214 642 642 1,856 4.7% 8
Iraq 1,710 25 25 1,735 4.4% 9
United Kingdom 1,646 417 355 62 1,708 4.3% 10
Mexico 1,883 96 365 -268 1,614 4.1% 11
Canada 1,130 411 210 201 1,331 3.4% 12
Libya 988 225 225 1,213 3.1% 13
Algeria 442 556 556 997 2.5% 14
Oman 917 917 2.3% 15
Indonesia 599 196 196 795 2.0% 16
Qatar 606 78 78 684 1.7% 17
Kazakhstan 630 630 1.6% 18
Angola 660 660 1.7% 19
Colombia 576 576 1.5% 20
TOTAL 33,705 6,489 953 5,786 39,441 100% n/a
World Total 37,333 16,499 14,955 1,543 38,876 100% n/a
1,000 b/d  17 
 these two countries provided nearly 30 per cent of world exports in 2001. Specific 
comments on each of the top twenty exporters are included below. 
 
Saudi Arabia  
Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in terms of production capacity and proven 
reserves. In 2001, as well as producing 8.8 million b/d (of which over 6 million were 
crude exports), the country still had a spare capacity of almost 3.3 million b/d. Indeed, 
the last time a production peak at over 11 million b/d was attained was in1980. Hence, 
it has significant flexibility in its production, as output comes from large, well-
behaved fields. Its proven reserves of over 260 billion b/d account for about one 
quarter of the world known reserves of conventional oil, and give Saudi Arabia an R/P 
ratio of 85 years. 
 
Saudi Arabia can look confidently at its long-term supply capacity, which could be 
increased to 20 million b/d if demand calls for such an expansion. However, Saudi 
Arabia faces political risks in the short-term and medium term. These are risks of 
political instability arising from the possible strengthening of Islamic extremists in 
response to US policy towards Palestine, Iraq, and Muslim countries in general. 
 
Russia 
Russia is the world’s second largest oil exporter. Russian exports stood at 4.6 million 
b/d in 2001, with crude exports at 3.3 million b/d. Oil production was at 7 million b/d, 
which is way below the previous peak reached in 1987 of 11.5 million b/d. Russia at 
present does not hold spare capacity, and is unlikely to hold it in the future. However, 
output and exports have been increasing in the past two years, and is likely to do so at 
the rate of 0.4-0.45 million b/d until 2005-2006. Thereafter the increase may be 
limited to 0.1 million b/d because expansion will require the development of new oil 
fields in difficult areas. At the current R/P ratio of 19 years, its proven reserves of 
near 49 billion barrels should last into the long term, but heavy investment will be 
needed to prevent a decline in production in the medium term.  
 
The most important problem facing Russian production and exports is the significant 
economic risk from a fragile economic performance and continuing strains from   18 




In 2001, Norway’s net oil exports were at nearly 3 million b/d. Oil production totalled 
3.4 million b/d (estimate includes condensates and natural gas plant liquids), which 
was also a historical peak. It ranked as the third largest exporter in the world but it is 
has no spare capacity. Its proven reserves of near 9 billion barrels are small, and 
cannot sustain high production levels for a long time. Natural depletion in the medium 
term, rather than political, economic or institutional risk, will be the main problem 
that will affect Norwegian supplies. 
 
Iran 
Iran is the world’s fourth largest exporter. In 2001, it exported just under 2.7 million 
b/d (of which 2.4 million b/d were crude). Production reached 3.7 million b/d, which 
has been near the peak since 1978/1979 (the last time 6 million barrels were produced 
was 1973). Current installed capacity is higher that the OPEC quota of 3.19 million 
b/d. However, beyond that, Iran has limited flexibility in output, with many fields in 
need of upgrading and modernisation, and few significant discoveries except in the 
Caspian Sea. At a current R/P of over 67 years, Iran’s proven reserves of near 90 
billion barrels should last into the very long term.  
 
Sorting out production arrangements with its Caspian neighbours is an immediate task 
to be tackled. But Iran’s main problem is to overcome the economic risk resulting 
from the currently insufficient provision of government funding for investments, and 
to make the current contractual framework more attractive to foreign companies. 
 
Venezuela 
In 2001, Venezuela was the world’s fifth largest exporter, and accounted for 4.9 per 
cent of world production. Of the 3.4 million b/d allegedly produced that year, 
(Venezuelan data tend to overestimate actual output) 2.7 million b/d were exported, of 
which 2 million were crude oil exports. Venezuelan exports are one of the top four 
sources of supplies for the USA. With little new explorations and poor maintenance in 
recent years, current capacity stands just above production levels. It is estimated that   19 
future investment levels by PdVSA will need to double in order to protect and 
upgrade this capacity. Venezuela is also important in terms of proven reserves 
(currently at 77.7 million barrels), which are expected to last well into the long term. 
In addition, its Orinoco Belt holds hundreds of million barrels of heavy-oil and 
bitumen. Venezuela, together with Canada, will be able to supply non-conventional 
oil in large quantities in the very long-term. 
 
Venezuela continues to experience considerable social, economic, and political 
difficulties, and the organisation of the oil industry has been a key issue in the 
confrontation between president Chavez and the opposition. One cannot exclude the 
possibility of a downward spiral dragging down Venezuela including its oil sector in 
the short term. 
 
UAE 
The UAE exported 2.1 million b/d in 2001 of mostly crude oil, out of a total crude 
output of 2.4 million b/d. As such, it ranked as the sixth largest exporter. The UAE 
has some spare capacity as its total oil output capacity is near 2.65 million b/d, with a 
peak output of 2.6 million already achieved in 1990. The nature of its fields, sustained 
increases in recovery, recent offshore finds, and the absence of financial constraints, 
means that it has the ability to expand its output capacity. Proven reserves are 
estimated to be 98 billion barrels and with a R/P ratio in excess of 100 years (Table 1) 
should last well into the long term.  
 
There are no reports of technical constraints on future plans of expansion. As with 
most countries in the Arab Gulf, the UAE faces geo-political risk resulting from the 




Nigeria was the world seventh largest exporter of crude oil in 2001, with 1.9 million 
b/d of mostly crude oil exported in that year. Total crude production in 2001 was at an 
estimated 2.15 million b/d. This was marginally below the 1997 peak of 2.4 million 
b/d, which was also achieved in 1979. Nigeria’s crude production continues  to 
experience noticeable disruption to supplies. Every year there are many attacks and   20 
disruptions by the local population, particularly in the delta region, who are seeking to 
halt the perceived usurpation of their economic and environmental rights. In addition 
there are also many incidents of vandalism and illegal siphoning. Oil spills that cause 
deaths and further environmental degradation are still marring the industry, with 
somewhat substandard installations not helping.  
 
Nonetheless, the outlook for Nigeria has been buoyed by recent discoveries in the 
deep-water, and by measures taken by government to encourage further exploration 
by private oil companies. The country has ambitious plans to expand its current 
production capacity to 4 million b/d after 2020. It is already claimed that oil reserves 
will reach 30 billion barrels next year, and 40 billion barrels in the long term, but this 
will not materialise without at least doubling current levels of investments. With 
proved reserves at 24 billion barrels that should last into the longer term, its share of 
world reserves was slightly below 2.3 per cent in 2001.  
 
Nigeria’s short and medium term problems are the high overall political risk, as its 
emerging democracy and political stability are fragile. In particular, there is  
increasing concern in the international community of breaches in human rights law 
which could in the extreme case might cause companies to reconsider significant 
capital investment programmes, particularly if this might cause them problems in their 
domicile as has already happened to Shell. Nigeria should be able to at worst maintain 
its current position, and more likely and hopefully expand its production and market 
share, once the aforementioned problems are tackled and public finances reformed.  
 
Kuwait 
Kuwait was the world’s eighth largest exporter. It exported in total 1.86 million b/d in 
2001, including 1.2 million b/d of crude. Kuwait has a spare capacity of some 300,000 
b/d above current production. An old ambitious plan to take production from 2.1 
million b/d to 4.0 million b/d by 2004 will not be realised before many years.  Its 
proven reserves are very large at 96.5 billion barrels. 
 
In the short-term, Kuwait faces technical constraints following last’s year incident 
(the fire at Rawdhatain oil field in January 2002), and a more significant risk from the 
present geo-political conjuncture. In the medium and longer term, the main sources of   21 
uncertainty are internal politics, relating respectively to the stability of the ruling elite, 
and to the issue of foreign participation and ownership in the sector.  
 
Iraq 
Despite drastic difficulties, dilapidated facilities, and strained oil fields, Iraq ranked as 
the world’s 9
th largest exporter. While total crude output managed to reach 2.4 million 
b/d, Iraq exported some 1.7 million b/d in 2001. These production levels are well 
below recent peaks of 2.5-3 million b/d, below the 3.5 million b/d produced in 1978, 
and way below ambitious long-term targets to produce aggressively at 6 million b/d. 
Current supplies are really produced in crisis mode, and the industry is in urgent need 
of spending money on rehabilitation of all aspects of production. Iraq’s potential as a 
major supplier remain buoyed by proven reserves of over 112 billion barrels, which 
should enable production in the very long-term.. 
 
Iraq faces immediate economic constraints arising from sanctions preventing export 
increase. Its entire supplies are at risk in the likely event of an American strike, Iraq’s 




In 2001, the UK was the world’s 10
th largest exporter. Its net oil exports for that year 
were at nearly 1.7 million b/d. Oil production was at much higher level of 2.5 million 
b/d, but below the 1999 peak of 2.9 million. It has no spare capacity. Its current R/P 
ratio is a mere 5.6 years, and with proven reserves of under 5 billion barrels, the UK 
faces an immediate technical risk of the natural depletion of supplies. 
 
Mexico 
At 3.56 million b/d of crude produced in 2001, Mexico accounted for just under 5 per 
cent of world production, and with 1.6 million b/d exported, it ranked as the 11th 
largest exporter. It has no significant spare capacity. PEMEX has historically pursued 
a policy of maximising output from existing fields. Indeed output for 2001 represents 
a historical peak. It plans to raise output to 4 million b/d in the next few years. Its 
proven reserves have been stagnant recently and currently stand at 27.7 billion barrels.   22 
Unless new fields are discovered and brought into production, it is hard to see Mexico 
satisfy growing domestic consumption. 
 
Mexico’s oil production may well face significant supply tightness and technical risks 
by 2020 if it does not secure the necessary investments. A hotly debated issue is the 
opening up of the oil upstream sector to foreign investment. 
 
Canada 
In 2001, Canada was the world’s twelfth largest exporter, although it had a much 
larger share of world oil production. While output for that year reached a historical 
peak of nearly 2.8 million b/d, its net oil exports were at over 1.3 million b/d. It has no 
significant spare capacity. Its current R/P ratio is at a under 9 years, and proven 
reserves at under 7 billion barrels. However, Canada is known to have huge potential 
in terms of non-conventional oil in the form of oil sands. Canada will probably cease 
to be a supplier of conventional oil in the long term because of the natural depletion of 
reserves but is likely to retain an important player in world oil. 
 
Libya 
Libya exported just over 1.2 million b/d of crude and products in 2001, while output 
reached over 1.4 million b/d. It was the world’s thirteenth largest exporter. Libya’s 
current production capacity is estimated at 1.5 million b/d, which is the peak reached 
in 1997. This is below the historical peak of 3.4 million reached in 1970. Libya could 
still be said to have a small volume of spare capacity but output flexibility is limited. 
In the medium term, Libya hopes that output can be restored to 2 million b/d with 
foreign investment. Proven reserves currently stand at 29.5 billion barrels but under 
explored acreage and lack of recent investment suggests that this figure could rise as 
more of Libyan territory is explored. Libya’s immediate problem is the US-led 





In 2001, Algeria ranked as the world fourteenth largest exporter. It produced 1.56 
million b/d and exports stood at 997,800 b/d (estimates include refined products,   23 
condensates and natural gas plant liquids). Its existing fields still have large reserves, 
and exploration success rates in other areas have been high, indicating great medium 
term potential. Its proven reserves are near 9 billion barrels. However, recent 
exploration activities, including the use of enhanced oil recovery systems, may soon 
imply upward revisions of these reserve estimates. Algeria faces in a number of 
severe social, economic, and political difficulties in the short to medium term. These 
have not threatened supplies but may constrain growth.  
 
Oman 
Oman exported 917,000 b/d in 2001, and produced 959,000 b/d of crude, which is 
very near the 2000 peak of 961,000 b/d. As such, it was the world’s fifteenth largest 
exporter. Despite significant exploration and development investment in recent years, 
including the used of enhanced recovery techniques, Oman’s proven reserves have 
remained stagnant and currently stand at 5.5 billion barrels with a R/P ratio of just 
over 5 years. As a consequence, Oman will face the prospect of declining output in 
the medium and long term, as well as problems in maintaining current levels of crude 
supplies in the short term.  
 
Indonesia 
In 2001, Indonesia was only the world’s sixteenth largest exporter. Its net oil exports 
for that year were nearly 795 000 b/d (of which 599,000 were crude oil). Oil 
production has remained flat at around 1.3-1.4 million b/d for the past few years down 
from the maximum output of 1.6 million b/d that was reached in 1994.  It is has no 
significant spare capacity, its current R/P ratio is just 10 years, and proven reserves 
stand at 8 billion barrels. There is political unrest and civil strife in Indonesia and 
terrorist incidents have occurred. A decline in oil production, combined with 
increasing domestic consumption, is expected to cause significant fall in exports in the 
next few years. 
 
Qatar 
Qatar is one of the world’s smaller exporters, and is ranked seventeenth in the league 
of exporters. In 2001, it produced 783,000 b/d, which is just below the peak level of 
790 reached in 2000. Exports in 2001 stood at 684,000 b/d, most of which consisted 
of crude oil. In the last few years, Qatar has been investing significantly and taking   24 
several measures to encourage foreign firm participation. This should help extend the 
life of existing fields and lead new discoveries, although no great surprises are likely. 
Its proven reserves are likely to remain at around 15.5 billion barrels, and they should 
last into the long term at the current rate of production. Qatar faces significant geo-
political risk. A US-Iraqi war could have a long-term destabilizing impact on the 
political regime.  
 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakh exports continued to rise and peaked at 631,000 b/d in 2001, and crude output 
reached 882,000 b/d. The local oil industry faces significant technical and economic 
constraints in the short-term, as Kazakhstan lacks the required infrastructure and 
pipelines, with recent projects also delayed. Its proven reserves of n ear 8 billion 
barrels are low but recent exploration activities suggest that these reserves estimates 
are very conservative. Kazakhstan’s future export plans are ambitious because of 
recent significant exploration successes. The main problem for Kazakhstan’s oil 
industry are its limited installed production and export facilities, which will require 
economic resources and political stability if they are to be expanded. 
 
Angola 
Thanks to steadily rising output over the last decade, Angola is now Africa’s second 
largest producer after Nigeria. Exports reached 660,000 in 2001, the same year that it 
produced 731,000 b/d compared to a peak of 745,000 in 2000. Virtually of Angola’s 
oil reserves are located offshore and its capacity is being developed gradually. 
Investments in the sector have reached $4 billion recently, but are expected to rise to 
around $18 billion in the short-term. This will allow production to double by 2007. 
Angola’s proved reserves are currently at 5.4 million barrels, but are expected to 
increase significantly given the major investment in exploration by the major 
companies. 
 
Angola is still currently considered as facing high overall political risk as civil war 
only ceased a few months ago. Further expansion of the oil sector will require the 
government to upgrade its administrative capacity in order to speed up investment 
decisions. However, the political structure remains fragile because of allegations of   25 




In 2001, Colombia accounted for 1.5 per cent of world oil exports, exporting 526,000 
b/d.  Production was 616,000 b/d in 2001 compared to a government target of 636,000 
b/d and to a peak of nearly 840,000 b/d reached in 1999. The main risk to Colombian 
supplies is primarily geo-political in nature.  The oil industry witnessed a record 
number of guerrilla attacks in 2001. The 170 attacks on the main Cano Limón oil 
pipeline are estimated to have disrupted the supply of 24 million barrels, equivalent to 
11% of 2001 production. High geo-political risk in the medium term may lead to more 
disruptions. Domestic and foreign capital needed to maintain current production 
capacity and identify new reserves is unlikely to materialise until the political 
situation improves. Colombia does not have large proven reserves, currently estimated 
at less than 2 billion, with an R/P ratio of under 8 years. Colombian ministerial 
sources hope new investment could sustain production in the range of 800,000 b/d but 
there is a technical risk resulting from natural depletion. 
 
2.2 Near-, medium- and long-term supply of oil 
 
Figure 3 summarises the current reserves and export capacity of the main oil 
exporting countries. The table is based on our own subjective judgment although 
those countries with immediate spare export capacity are well documented in the 
literature. Of the top twenty exporters Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and 
Kuwait are identified as the only three countries with significant spare capacity. 
Nigeria, Libya and Algeria all have limited spare capacity but this is considered 
insufficient to materially affect world markets.  
 
Most countries do appear to have the potential to increase their proven reserves base. 
However, there is a difference between having the ability to increase the reserves base 
and the actual requirement to do so. For example, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates have the ability to significantly increase their reserves, but they have no 
incentive while they have significant spare productive capacity. In contrast, countries 
such as the UK, Oman and Indonesia do not appear to have much scope to    26 
Figure 3:  Main Exporters: Summary of Reserves and Export Capacity  
 
Notes: This table combines information from OPEC, BP, and the US Department of 
Energy. 
* non-conventional oil 
 
 
Saudi Arabia yes no need yes yes
Russia no yes yes yes, declining
Norway no no no yes, declining
Iran no may be yes yes
Venezuela no yes yes yes
Nigeria little yes yes yes
United Arab Emirates yes yes yes yes
Kuwait yes no need yes yes
Iraq no yes yes yes
United Kingdom no no no no
Mexico no  yes yes yes, declining
Canada no * * *
Libya little yes yes yes
Algeria little yes yes yes
Oman no no no yes, declining
Indonesia no no no no
Qatar no little little yes, declining
Kazakhstan no yes yes yes
Angola no yes yes yes
Colombia no no no yes, declining











increase exports in 
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Figure 4: 2001 Production, Capacity and Spare Capacity (‘000 bbl/d) 
 
Prod Capacity Surplus
USA 7717 7949 232
Canada 2763 2846 83
Mexico 3560 3667 107
Total North America 14040 14461 421
 
Argentina 822 847 25
Brazil 1337 1377 40
Colombia 627 646 19
Ecuador 416 428 12
Peru 102 105 3
Trinidad & Tobago 135 139 4
Venezuela 3418 3521 103
Other S. & Cent. America 144 148 4
Total S. & Cent. America 7001 7211 210
 
Denmark 342 352 10
Italy 79 81 2
Norway 3414 3516 102
Romania 130 134 4
United Kingdom 2503 2578 75
Other Europe 341 351 10
Total Europe 6808 7012 3850
 
Azerbaijan 300 309 9
Kazakhstan 828 853 25
Russian Federation 7056 7268 212
Turkmenistan 162 167 5
Uzbekistan 172 177 5
Other Former Soviet Union 134 138 4
Total Former Soviet Union 8652 8912 260  28 
Figure 4: 2001 Production, Capacity and Spare Capacity (‘000bbl/d) (continued) 
Prod Capacity Surplus
Iran 3688 3799 111
Iraq 2414 2486 72
Kuwait 2142 2300 158
Oman 959 988 29
Qatar 783 807 23
Saudi Arabia 8768 11000 2232
Syria 551 567 17
United Arab Emirates 2422 2650 229
Yemen 458 472 14
Other Middle East 49 51 1
Total Middle East 22233 25119 2886
 
Algeria 1563 1610 47
Angola 731 753 22
Cameroon 80 82 2
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) 271 279 8
Egypt 758 781 23
Equatorial Guinea 181 186 5
Gabon 301 310 9
Libya 1425 1500 75
Nigeria 2148 2212 64
Tunisia 73 75 2
Other Africa 284 293 9
Total Africa 7814 8081 267
 
Australia 733 755 22
Brunei 195 201 6
China 3308 3407 99
India 782 805 23
Indonesia 1410 1452 42
Malaysia 788 812 24
Papua New Guinea 57 59 2
Thailand 178 183 5
Vietnam 350 361 11
Other Asia Pacific 143 148 4
Total Asia Pacific 7943 8182 238
TOTAL WORLD 74493 78978 4486  29 
 
Figure 5: Projections of Oil Production Capacity 2010-2020 under ‘Low Growth’ 
scenario (OIES base case) and ‘High Growth’ scenario (‘000bbl/d). (cont’d overleaf) 
 
Notes: Includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (natural gas liquids - the liquid content of 
natural gas where this is recovered separately)Source: Data for 1995 and 2001:  BP,  Statistical Review 
of  World Energy,  June 2002. Projected data are by OIES. 
 
Home Best
Country 2001 2010 2020 2020
USA 7949 7700 5700 5800
Canada 2846 3000 3500 4200
Mexico 3667 4000 4800 5500
Total North America 14461 14700 14000 15500
 
Argentina 847 1000 900 1000
Brazil 1377 1500 1700 2400
Colombia 646 850 700 850
Ecuador 428 300 200 200
Peru 105 90 60 60
Trinidad & Tobago 139 90 60 60
Venezuela 3521 4600 6000 7500
Other S. & Cent. America 148 50 30 30
Total S. & Cent. America 7211 8480 9650 12100
 
Denmark 352 100 50 50
Italy 81 90 50 50
Norway 3516 3000 1700 1700
Romania 134 90 50 50
United Kingdom 2578 1500 700 700
Other Europe 351 300 200 200
Total Europe 7012 5080 2750 2750
 
Azerbaijan 309 1200 1300 1500
Kazakhstan 853 2000 2400 2700
Russian Federation 7268 9500 10000 10500
Turkmenistan 167 200 120 150
Uzbekistan 177 150 100 100
Other Former Soviet Union 138 100 100 150
Total Former Soviet Union 8912 13150 14020 15100
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Figure 5: Projections of Oil Production Capacity 2010-2020 (continued) 
 
Home Best
Country 2001 2010 2020 2020
Iran 3799 4800 4500 4800
Iraq 2486 5000 6000 6000
Kuwait 2300 2800 2800 3500
Oman 988 600 400 400
Qatar 807 700 600 600
Saudi Arabia 11000 13000 18000 20000
Syria 567 300 100 150
United Arab Emirates 2650 3500 3500 3700
Yemen 472 200 100 150
Other Middle East 51 50 50 100
Total Middle East 25119 30950 36050 39400
 
Algeria 1610 2650 2650 2800
Angola 753 1300 1700 2200
Cameroon 82 50 40 40
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) 279 250 180 180
Egypt 781 500 300 300
Equatorial Guinea 186 250 250 250
Gabon 310 200 120 120
Libya 1500 1800 1800 1800
Nigeria 2212 2800 3000 3500
Tunisia 75 50 10 10
Other Africa 293 160 100 100
Total Africa 8081 10010 10150 11300
 
Australia 755 600 570 570
Brunei 201 100 60 60
China 3407 4000 3300 3600
India 805 1100 700 700
Indonesia 1452 900 600 600
Malaysia 812 600 400 400
Papua New Guinea 59 30 10 10
Thailand 183 150 80 80
Vietnam 361 250 100 100
Other Asia Pacific 148 170 100 100
Total Asia Pacific 8182 7900 5920 6220
TOTAL WORLD 78978 90270 92540 102370
Of which: OPEC 30181
                 Non-OPEC 48797  31 
 
significantly increase reserves. These mature provinces are struggling to sustain let 
alone grow reserves. Elsewhere some countries, such as Norway might have the 
potential to increase reserves but it is likely to be limited in comparison to countries 
such as Iraq and Iran. 
 
Of course there is a real linkage between the potential to increase exports in the 
medium term and the potential to increase reserves. Therefore those countries, such as 
the United Kingdom, Oman, Indonesia and Norway, which we identified as having 
limited potential to increase proved reserves, will also have difficulty in increasing 
export capacity.  
 
Looking longer term, it is possible to identify those countries that might be unable to 
continue exporting oil. We have identified the United Kingdom and Indonesia as 
being two countries that will become net importer by 2020. In addition, we expect 
Russia, Colombia, Oman, Qatar and Norway to remain net exporters, but the impact 
of depletion could reduce their relative importance. The major resource holders of the 
Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are expected to remain major 
exporters. 
 
In Figure 5 we have estimated the maximum productive capacity for the major oil 
exporters over the medium- and long-term. For 2020 we have estimated maximum 
production capacity under our own scenario (equivalent  to the ‘Low Growth’ 
scenario) and our High Growth expectation of production capacity under ideal 
economic conditions (‘High Growth’). In our view, medium term (by 2010) 
productive capacity could rise by 16 million b/d to 92 million b/d. However, our 
analysis suggest that the major exporting countries will have difficulty in sustaining 
this production capacity beyond 2010 and without further investment, production 
capacity could fall back to 88 million b/d by 2020. 
 
This has important implications. If demand for oil rises at historical levels then there 
will be sufficient spare capacity by 2010, which could be utilised to meet oil demand 
after that date. For example, productive capacity only rose by 6 million b/d in the six 
year period from 1995 to 2001 to meet rising demand, and it seems unlikely that in   32 
eight years to 2010 oil demand will rise at almost twice the rate. However, if demand 
for oil did reach 90 million b/d by 2010, there would be considerable tightening in the 
market after that date if productive capacity became as constrained as we envisage. 
 
Current estimates of spare production capacity available in January 2003 are shown 
on Figure 4. Most countries have spare capacity of around 3 per cent to take account 
of down time and to allow some flexibility in the system. However, relative to 2002 
levels of production, Saudi Arabia has approximately 3mb/d, which could be activated 
over 4 months by tranches (1mb/d within one month, another 1mb/d within the second 
month, 0.5mb/d within the third and 0.5mb/d within the fourth month). In addition, 
the UAE could increase production by 100,000b/d within a month, another 
100,000b/d within the third month. Kuwait could add 100,000b/d within one or two 
months and Libya 50,000 to 75,000b/d within two months.  
 
In Algeria, the constraints are more to do with lifting rather than production capacity, 
which is expected to rise to 1.5mb/d by the middle of 2003. Current production is 
900,000/950,000b/d. Algeria does not have the 1.2mb/d midstream capacity 
(pipelines, SBMs, storage and other port facilities) required to export the maximum 
volume corresponding to the 1.5mb/d production volume. In fact, new pipelines are 
unlikely to be completed before the end of the year with port facilities taking longer to 
complete. 
 
We do not believe that Nigeria can produce more than they are achieving at present on 
a sustained basis. The production volume fluctuates from month to month due to a 
host of factors: technical, managerial, institutional (like in Iran) and because of strikes 
and other incidents. Therefore all the talk that Algeria and Nigeria are presently 
constrained by OPEC policies is not credible. 
 
2.3 OIES production capacity estimates and implications for ‘Low Growth’ and ‘High 
Growth’ scenarios 
 
The ‘High Growth’ scenario assumes 2.6% growth in oil demand from 2000 to 2200. 
This is extraordinarily unrealistic. For demand to grow at that rate requires the world 
economy to grow at 4% per annum (at least) over 20 years and oil production capacity   33 
in 2020 to reach the very implausible level of 124 mb/d. The 4% rate of economic 
growth is arrived at assuming that oil demand increases at about 0.66 times the rate of 
economic growth, which is a generous assumption. The capacity level of 124 mb/d in 
2020 is needed to meet the 121mb/d of demand in 2020 generated by the 2.6% annual 
growth rate over 20 years and allow for 3mb/d surplus capacity which the system 
must hold to avoid friction and cope with any supply or demand contingencies. 
 
If we assume that extant capacity for oil liquids (crude oil and condensates) is 79mb/d 
today, the additional capacity required under the High Growth scenario will be of the 
order of 45 mb/d. The most bullish estimates that we are able to conceive for capacity 
increases by 2020 by country are shown in Figure 6 (our ‘High Growth’ scenario). In 
our view, the 45mb/d of additional capacity is unattainable. In fact even an additional 
capacity of a more modest 30mb/d is outside the range. 
 
The Low Growth scenario assumes 1% annual growth until 2020. This projects 
demand for liquids to 90mb/d in 2020, which will require a capacity of 92-93 b/d. 
That is an increase of 13-14 mb/d, which is achievable. In summary, our High Growth 
possible scenario would take demand to 103mb/d in 2020 and our low scenario 
(identical to Low Growth) to 90 mb/d (Figure 5).   34 
Figure 6: Realistic capacity increases 2000-2020 
Country              mb/d 
Saudi Arabia                             9 
Russia                                       3  
Iraq                                           3 
Venezuela (conventional oil)                      2             
Kuwait                                     1 
UAE                                  1        
Iran                                           1 
Other Latin America                2 
Caspian                                    2-3 
Algeria                                     1 
West Africa                              2-3 
Others                                       1 
 
Sub-total                                         28-30 
 
+Canada & Venezuela non-conventional        3-4 
 
Total                                           31-34 
 
Less capacity reductions: 
 
North Sea                                    3-4 
ME non OPEC and Egypt            1 
US and others                               2-3 
 
Net                                              24-28 
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3. Potential Supply Disruptions 
A table showing the main risks of supply disruptions is shown below. 
 
The rationale behind each of these subjective judgments is discussed below. 
 
3.1 Geo-politics/National politics 
 
3.1.1 The Middle East 
Recent history tells us that oil supply disruptions in the Middle-East (or more 
precisely the Gulf region) were due to two different types of events: the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and political instability leading to a revolution in a major oil-exporting 
country.  The former was responsible for disruptions of different degree in importance 
in 1956 and 1973; the latter for the 1979 supply problems.  History also tells us that 
disruptions do not necessarily follow every Arab-Israeli war or Palestinian intifada, 
every regional war or political regime change.  The 1967 Arab-Israeli war had a 
negligible impact on oil supply, as there was sufficient surplus capacity to compensate 
for the short-term disruption of Middle East supplies.  Similarly, the rise in oil prices 
in 1973 was inevitable given the lack of investment in the upstream business in the 
five presiding years and therefore the shortage of spare capacity in the even to f any 
supply disruption. The regime changes in Algeria were not noticed on the oil front.  
More remarkably the long Iraq-Iran war of 1981-8 coincided with a period of falling 
oil prices.  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent UN military response 
(Desert Storm) disturbed the oil market over a relatively short period of five and a half 
months.  The episode, however, was remarkable in one respect: the speed with which 
a sudden supply reduction of about 4.5mb/d to the world market was fully 
compensated by increased supplies from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  Serious conflicts 
or destabilizing political events may or may not cause a significant disturbance in oil 
markets, and when they do the duration of the crisis could be so short in some 
instances as to leave no real impact, or sufficiently long as to have durable effects. 
  Home Best
  Near Medium Long Near Medium Long
Economic Low Low Low Low Moderate Moderate
Political Sporadic Sporadic Sporadic Sporadic Sporadic Sporadic
Institutional Low Low Low Low Moderate Moderate
Technical Low Low Moderate Low Moderate High  36 
 
History tells us nevertheless that in assessing the contemporary situation we must 
consider as potential causes of oil supply disruptions: the Arab-Israeli conflict which 
has been going through a violent phase today, the US-Iraqi conflict that may lead to 
war, and the threats to the stability of political regimes in countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait or Iran. 
 
The Arab-Israeli conflict is expressing itself today not as a war between nation-states 
(Egypt, Syria, Jordan versus Israel) as in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 but as an intifada 
that is a civilian uprising involving acts of violence from Palestinians against both 
Israeli civilians and military personnel.  These actions lead to Israeli retaliation, which 
also involves acts of violence that induces further Palestinian responses.  Neither 
Israel, nor Palestine are oil-exporting countries.  The Arab world, which holds huge 
hydrocarbon reserves, produces and exports considerable volumes of oil feels for the 
Palestinians.  There is enormous frustration at the US policy towards the conflict and 
at the failure of the Arab regimes to stand up to either the USA or Israel.  There is also 
deep sympathy for the sufferings of the Palestinians  – an oppressed people on 
territories occupied by a colonial and repressive power. 
 
Whatever the merits of the respective cases of Israelis and Palestinians, the relevant 
point in the context of this study concerned with the security of oil supplies is the 
perceptions of Arabs and other Muslim countries (e.g. Iran), which happen to be 
sitting on huge oil reserves. 
 
Arab frustration with the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict has important impacts 
on the polity of Arab countries.  The possible political effects include: 
 
•  the expansion of underground terrorist groups and consequent increases in 
violence both within and outside the Muslim world. 
•  a strengthening of legitimate Islamic and nationalist political parties or 
movements who may either become the majority party in those countries 
where democratic elections are held or induce non-democratic regimes to 
adopt policies advocated by Islamists and more generally by nationalists.   37 
•  Islamic radicals managing in some countries to overthrow the existing regime 
either through a military coup d’état led by officers sympathetic to the radical 
Islamic tendency or by a popular revolution as was the case in Iran in 1979. 
 
The implications of these three types of political effects on oil supplies may be as 
follows: 
 
Case 1 that is terrorism may result in damages done to an oil installation (oilfields, 
pipelines, processing plants, terminals, refinery) or to oil shipping.  This could also 
happen to gas installations/tankers with repercussions on oil prices.  The terrorist 
action could take place anywhere in the world, not exclusively, not necessarily in oil-
exporting countries.  The probability of such incidents occurring is far from negligible 
but the damage they cause is likely to be small when assessed at the global level.  One 
or two tankers hit once every six or twelve months does not cripple oil shipping; the 
sabotage of a pipeline is usually rapidly repaired; and a fire in a refinery or in a few 
oil wells do not disrupt world supplies in a very noticeable way.  Acts of terror have, 
however, a psychological impact that causes prices to rise over a short period.  The 
terror incidents that would have a significant impact on oil supplies are those that 
cause great damage to a major oil export terminal (Dhahran in Saudi Arabia for 
example) through say the hijacking and ramming of a tanker or, to pumping stations 
along an important pipeline or to gas separation and other processing plants on a 
major oilfield.  The probability of these types of incidents occurring is very small.  
 
Case 2 being a significant increase of the Islamist and nationalist political influence 
(direct or indirect) in an oil-exporting country could have two different effects on oil.  
The first is increased militancy in oil policy, including demands for restrictive 
production programmes in OPEC or in association with OPEC, and greater reluctance 
to open doors to foreign investments in the upstream sector.  The second set of effects 
arise from the loss through emigration of competent oil professionals who may leave 
the country because of their liberal or secular inclinations, from the difficulties of (or 
the refusal to) recruit Western technicians, and from the introduction of restrictive 
laws and regulations which hinder performance.  In all these instances oil production 
may fall either in a sudden single drop or in a decline over a period of time.  Sooner or   38 
later the decline will however stop but the higher output levels obtained earlier on are 
never recovered.   
 
Case 3 being a change of the political regime through a military coup or a popular 
revolution that brings Islamists or radical nationalists to power would have effects 
similar to Case 2 in nature, but more marked in intensity.  The immediate impact on 
the oil market of a revolution in a major oil-exporting country is a price increase due 
to uncertainty.  Prices will rise even if oil production is not reduced or interrupted but 
in this case the increase will be short lived.  If the revolution results in a drop or an 
interruption of production the price rise will be both significant and of longer 
duration.  This case is similar to what happened in 1979 because of the Iranian Islamic 
revolution. 
 
The impact in the medium-term is a fall in oil production, which stabilizes (as 
mentioned above under Case 2) well below peak levels previously attained. 
 
The US-Iraq conflict, which is likely to lead to a US military intervention in Iraq, 
unless the Saddam Hussein’s regime is overthrown by a military coup d’état, will 
have the following impact on the oil market.  It is important to distinguish a number 
of stages in a military intervention scenario. 
 
Stage 1 refers to the military action itself.  As soon as the war begins there will be a 
complete interruption in Iraqi oil exports.  The supply loss to the world export market 
will then be as high as 2 million barrels/day if the intervention occurs at a time when 
Iraq would be producing at maximum current capacity.  But the volume of Iraqi 
exports has been fluctuating in recent years from close to nothing to a maximum of 
2.2 million barrels/day.  These fluctuations are due to the outcome of negotiations 
with the United Nations over the oil for food programmes and the oil price formulae 
that have to be agreed upon at regular intervals.  
 
Clearly the immediate oil supply, and therefore price, impact at the beginning of a 
military intervention will depend among other things on the size of the Iraq, export 
volume at that time.  Other factors will plan an important role however.  If Iraq 
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Kuwait or Saudi Arabia oil traders will panic and push prices up.  If, on the contrary, 
traders see that Iraq has failed to use the small number of missiles it is believed to 
possess and any weapon of mass destruction, we could well witness a fall in price. 
 
The loss of Iraqi exports – assuming it to be as high as 2 m/barrels per day – may or 
may not be compensated for by increases in oil production in Saudi Arabia (and to a 
smaller extent in Kuwait, the UAE and other countries holding small amounts of 
surplus capacity).  If quickly compensated for, the oil price is likely to fall.  If not, and 
if on top of that, the USA and the IEA fail to implement credible measures for 
releasing strategic stocks and distributing emergency supplies to affected nations, then 
the oil price (once again other things being equal) will rise.  
 
The question of whether Saudi Arabia will immediately compensate for the Iraqi 
shortfall will depend on whether the Saudi government sees greater risks in refusing 
US demands for higher production or in acceding to these demands and alleviating a 
Saudi population deeply upset by US policy or Palestine and Iraq.  The Saudi action 
(producing more oil or not) will depend on the outcome of a judgement on what 
constitutes the greatest risk to the stability of the regime.  What is certain is that the 
Saudi government will be slow at reaching a decision. 
 
We need n ext to ask whether Iraq will blow up its oil wells as it did in Kuwait in 
1991.  President Saddam Hussein is convinced that the Americans are not only after 
him and his regime but after Iraq’s oil wealth.  If he had any doubts about that they 
would have been swept away by the views expressed by many Western commentators 
and journalists.  The prize is Iraqi oil. Aren’t we constantly reminded that President 
Bush, Mr Cheney and other prominent members of the current US administration had, 
or still have, interests in the oil industry as shareholders, former executives or 
consultants? President Hussein will want to deny the prize to his US enemies but 
since he cannot deny it altogether, blowing up the wells and other installations will at 
least delay the moment when the US will be able to enjoy the access to this wealth. 
 
If Saddam Hussein succeeds in blowing up the oil wells and some important plants 
(and this depends on whether his men will obey his orders and on whether US troops 
will occupy the oil fields before the fuses are lit etc) then the world export market will   40 
be denied some 2 million barrels/day of Iraqi oil for at least one year after the end of 
the military operations. Compensation from increased Saudi production is particularly 
critical in this case. 
 
Stage 2 refers to the political situation in Iraq after the military intervention. In our 
view the military phase is likely to be short (let us say a maximum of 3 or 4 months 
and most probably a shorter period) because the Iraqi army is no match to the superior 
US technology. The army morale is low, and urban guerrilla warfare led by elements 
of the Republican guard, the security services and the apparatchik of the Party may be 
very bloody but unlikely to last a very long time. The difficult task that will face the 
USA is not so much the military operation but the management of the political 
situation in Iraq after the intervention. There will be unrest, incidents and instability 
(even if this does not involve a civil war) whether attempts are made to install a 
‘democratic’ government, or the government is handed to a military dictator, or the 
USA decides to govern directly as in Germany or Japan after the Second World War 
(although this is unlikely). 
 
There will be unrest because a ‘democratic’ government will not be able to achieve a 
peaceful consensus among the different ethnic and religious groups that constitute 
other Iraqi population and between the various political tendencies existing in the 
country (baathists, Arab nationalists, Islamists, communists, secular liberals etc). A 
military dictator who cannot afford to be as ruthless as Saddam just after his demise 
will have difficulties in stabilising the country. A Sunni dictator will face either or 
both Kurdish and Shia unrest; a Shia dictator will face challenges from Sunni military 
officers. The Sunni Arab minority has dominated Iraq both under the Ottoman rule 
and since independence. It will not give up its historically privileged position without 
a fight.   
 
The oil industry will not flourish in an unstable Iraq. The idea that Iraq will open its 
doors to the foreign oil companies who will rush in, develop new oilfields and mend 
existing ones very rapidly is not realistic. The negotiation of new contracts between 
the Iraqi government and foreign oil companies will take time. Political instability in 
the country will cause the companies to hesitate and take their time. Expect delays 
therefore.   41 
 
Will a US military intervention in Iraq have an impact on the Arab world and by 
implication on oil supplies? The answer is yes but the impact is likely to be of the 
same nature as (but of greater intensity than) that of the Arab-Israeli conflict which 
was discussed earlier on: more terrorism, strengthening of Islamist political 
tendencies, possible Islamic revolutions in one or two countries. The impact on oil 
will be as discussed as before. The combination, however, of frustrations due to the 
Arab-Israeli problem and new frustrations due to the US action in Iraq will increase 
the likelihood of political effects and aggravate the possible impact on oil. The nature 
of the effects due to the Palestinian and the Iraqi problems are the same if looked at 
separately, but adding one to the other may prove to be more than a change in degree. 
The combination may trigger a response that each crisis on its own will only threaten 
without actually causing it. 
 
The issue that remains to the raised in this context is whether Arab or more generally 
Muslim countries will have recourse to the oil weapon that is a policy of oil 
production reductions combined with an embargo on exports to some countries such 
as the USA. 
 
The use of oil as a weapon is tempting for both oil importing and oil exporting 
countries because oil is a ‘political’ commodity.  
 
The political importance of oil is due, among other things, to the dependence of 
exporting countries on revenues and the dependence of importing countries on a fuel 
that is justly considered to the blood of the modern economy.  
 
The dependence of oil-exporting countries on revenues makes them vulnerable to the 
use of the oil weapon by the consuming countries that have a propensity to impose 
sanctions. In the past two decades sanctions have been imposed on Libya, Iraq and 
Iran, and on occasions their use was threatened against Nigeria, for example.  These 
sanctions have been imposed over very long periods and have caused serious 
hardships, especially in Iraq. 
   42 
On the other hand, oil is potentially a powerful weapon in the hands of exporting 
countries.  The reason is that oil is a fuel of choice because (a) it can be substituted for 
any other fuel in any type of energy use with relative speed and ease while other fuels 
can be substituted for oil in some of its applications only; (b) it enjoys a dominant and 
impregnable position in the transport sector (cars, trucks, ships and planes) if not in 
the very long run but certainly for a least a decade or two ahead. 
 
The transport sector is the linchpin of the modern economy. When paralysed, neither 
labour nor goods can move, and this paralyses very rapidly the rest of the economy. 
This phenomenon was observed in the UK in the year 2000 when a strike by the 
drivers of petrol trucks (used to deliver gasoline from the refineries to the service 
stations) threatened to bring the country to a stop in a matter of three or four days. 
 
In short, the modern economy is vulnerable to any serious disruption of physical oil 
supplies. The world economy is also vulnerable to the adverse effects on balances of 
payments of big and sudden rises in the price of oil. One could say that world 
economic growth is dependent, among other things, on some stability in oil prices. 
 
It is because of this double dependence, first on physical supplies and secondly on 
price stability, that the oil weapon was used by Arab countries in 1973. We thus have 
a situation in which both sides – the powerful industrialised countries and the major 
oil exporters – may be tempted to wield an ‘oil weapon’ against one another. 
 
This situation, however, is not symmetrical. The Great Powers impose sanctions on 
individual oil-exporting countries. The target is specific and can be focused without 
necessarily causing damage to other countries. Damage will only be caused if 
sanctions reduce oil output at a time when the world petroleum market is tight. And in 
that case the countries that impose sanctions and all other importers will suffer from 
the impact of high oil prices.  But if these targets are few in number, if the sanctions 
result in small reductions in output, and if the world market is oversupplied there will 
be no fall-out on the countries that impose sanctions or on anybody other than the 
countries that are targeted. And this is indeed what has been happening in recent years 
with the sanction regime imposed on three exporting countries.  
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It is infinitely more difficult for oil exporters to target the oil weapon on a specific 
country. This is because oil is widely and easily traded. It can be shipped from one 
location to another around the world. An embargo imposed, say, by Arab producers 
on oil exports to the USA would result in a reshuffling in the trade pattern of sources 
and destinations. This will cause some temporary inconvenience but the trade systems 
will ultimately adjust. 
 
To be effective, the embargo would be supplemented by a cutback in total production. 
In this way reshuffling will not restore the status quo ante. It will redistribute the 
shortfall in supplies among a number of countries. The result, however, will be a 
significant increase in oil prices that will affect all importing countries – friends and 
foes alike. In other words, an embargo plus cutbacks cause what the military like to 
call ‘collateral damage’. Theoretically, one could devise a compensation scheme in 
favour of the friendly countries; but it is difficult to imagine that such a scheme will 
ever be designed and implemented in practice.  
 
The argument often advanced against the use of the oil weapon by exporting countries 
is that they are dependent on revenues and cannot afford a production cutback. This is 
a wrong argument.  A significant production cut will raise prices by a higher 
percentage than the output reduction. Revenues will increase. A loss in revenues will 
only occur if exports are stopped altogether which is not a credible option. 
 
The correct argument is that although revenues will increase, and probably by a 
multiple in the short run, oil demand, and therefore revenues, will significantly 
decline in the long run because the oil-importing countries will seek all means, from 
energy efficiency measures to fuel substitution, to reduce their dependence on oil. The 
high costs of these policies will not deter them, so deep will the concern about supply 
security have become. 
 
We have thus noted two main problems associated with the use of the oil weapon: (a) 
the difficulties to target correctly the countries that are inimical to the Arab cause and 
the damages that will inevitably be inflicted on friendly countries in Europe, Africa, 
Latin America and Asia; and (b) the adverse effects on revenues in the long run. 
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There is a further consideration. In 1973, two superpowers, the USA and the Soviet 
Union, stood on the world scene. This limited the US ability to intervene militarily in 
the Middle East. Today, there is only one superpower. And this superpower has given 
itself the absolute right to intervene whenever and wherever it feels that its interests 
are being threatened. There is no Soviet Union to inhibit them from occupying 
oilfields if they feel hurt by an embargo on a production cutback.  
 
Of course in resisting a military intervention, oilfields can be set alight. That simply 
means that the use of the oil weapon could almost inevitably lead to a catastrophe. 
Clearly, this is not what the use of oil power is meant to achieve. The aim is to exert 
pressure in order to change US Middle East policy from absolute commitment to 
Israel to a more balanced and neutral stance, and to force the USA out of Iraq. 
 
The conclusion is that the oil weapon is available but will only be used by 
irresponsible governments because it invites military retaliation by a super-power, 
which today is not checked by another super power. A radical regime coming to 
power in Saudi Arabia after a revolution may be inexperienced and foolish enough to 
use the weapon. But as mentioned before this will have more catastrophic effects on 
the country itself than on those who are targeted by the weapon. 
 
3.1.2 Oil exporting countries outside the Middle East 
We are concerned here with the oil exporters of South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
South East Asia, also Russia and the Central Asian Republics. The reasonable 
assumption is that no political event is likely to threaten oil supplies from Norway, the 
UK or Canada for example. 
 
Here again history is a guide. There was a radical political change in Venezuela with 
the election of President Chavez and its inauguration in February 1999. The cause of 
Chavez electoral success was the gross mismanagement of the economy and the 
dilapidation of oil revenues by Venezuelan governments in the preceding 20 or 30 
years.  The large number of poor in Venezuela became poorer; widespread corruption 
fuelled social tensions; and economic mismanagement badly affected investment in 
the oil industry and the rate of growth.  The political impact was the emergence of a 
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and leader.  Radicalism has an impact on oil supplied because Chavez understood that 
OPEC co-operation, which involves a reduction in oil output, leads to a badly needed 
increase on revenues.  Incompetent management, however, also meant that a policy-
determined reduction in output which can be easily reversed when circumstances 
change was accompanied by a reduction in productive capacity that continued the 
trend begun under previous regimes.  At the difference of a policy-determined 
reduction in output, a decline in capacity cannot be as immediately reversed. 
 
Of course, President Chavez may be overthrown any day before the ink dries up on 
this paper.  But this is not the point.  The lesson we draw from the Venezuelan case is 
that  all oil-exporting countries of the third world (and this includes the 
Caspian/Central Asian countries) display similar behavioural characteristics.  There is 
widespread mismanagement corruption, increased income inequalities, poor economic 
performance almost everywhere.  Add to that the dismal human rights record, which 
was some (fortunately not all) of the third world exporting countries with so-called 
democratic or semi-democratic governments.  We think of Colombia, Ecuador, 
Angola, Nigeria, and other Western African countries, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan for example. 
 
Political changes in one or more of these countries will bring in governments with oil 
policy views similar to Chavez are not implausible.  To fight corruption such radical 
governments may turn against foreign oil companies, which operate in their countries 
whether or not these companies were guilty, or not of misdeeds. To obtain more 
revenues they may wish to co-operate with OPEC on production programmes.  And 
should they be incompetent and deprived from the foreign companies’ investments 
they may witness shrinkage of oil production capacity.   
 
Russia presents a slightly different case.  The stability of the present Russian political 
regime depends l argely on its ability to achieve economic growth, improve the 
condition of the rural and provincial population, which is suffering increasing poverty, 
and to keep within bounds the army’s anger at the loss of its status from that of a 
superpower to a middle-range nation.  A regime change is possible should Putin, or a 
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new regime will turn against the economic oligarchs affecting, for a while at least, the 
ability of Russian oil companies to promote ambitious growth targets. 
 
3.1.3 The Human Rights Issue 
Concerns about human rights violations in exporting nations and about damages done 
to the environment by foreign oil companies operating in these countries constitute an 
important political phenomenon.  Their impact in reducing the involvement or the 
scale of operation of the foreign oil companies in these countries has been small so far 
albeit not negligible.  The withdrawal of some companies from Myanmar, for 
example, may be an important sign of developments to come.  These concerns may 
generate very strong forces that will oblige oil companies to withdraw from some 
countries or reduce their scale of activity in order to improve their image and standing 
with Western public opinion, or avoid incidents similar to those faced by Shell in 
Germany because of the Brent Spar affair.  The companies may also decide to 
abandon their traditional non-involvement stance and put pressure on most 
governments to improve the human rights record.  In some instances this approach 
may cause conflicts with the government leading to the cancellation of contracts, even 
nationalisation. 
 
The impact on oil supplies in most of these instances will be a reduction of the growth 
potential if not some short-term reduction in capacity. 
 
3.2 Institutional Factors 
 
This includes reductions in supply resulting from the actions of a cartel.  We already 
have a weak cartel – OPEC – in oil.  Its performance over 42 years of history has not 
always been successful.  The two major successes attributed to OPEC – the price rises 
of 1973 and 1979 – had more to do with the market conditions prevailing at these 
precise moments than to an OPEC show of strength.  In both 1973 and 1979 OPEC 
was blamed by the consuming countries for the oil price shocks because it is easier to 
focus on an agent standing tall on the world stage than on subterranean and 
anonymous market forces.  OPEC helped in attracting this blame because it believed 
that the price rise was its own achievement, proclaimed that it had turned the tables   47 
against the major oil companies and the industrialized countries, and basked for a 
while in the glory of an apparent success. 
 
The truth, however, is that no merits are attached to a cartel when a price rise is the 
outcome of excess demand.  In 1973 and 1979 OPEC was sailing with the wind.  
There are merits when prices are prevented from falling (or their decline is mitigated) 
in a market suffering from excess supplies.  The OPEC golden age was neither in 
1973 nor in 1979 but in 1974-8 when the oil price was held almost constant at a time 
of emerging surplus supplies; and in 1982-5 when a catastrophic fall in prices due to a 
huge supply surplus was moderated into a slow, gradual decline. 
 
OPEC’s performance was judged  disastrous in 1986 and 1998 when oil prices 
collapsed down to $8 or $10 per barrel.  Paradoxically, these two ‘crises’, which were 
the manifestation of price wars, revealed that OPEC was indeed a cartel for the simple 
reason that only cartels or oligopolists can engage in price wars.  They may emerge 
badly bruised or deeply wounded from the battle but they can be truly identified as a 
cartel if they do emerge still alive. 
 
For long periods of its chequered history, OPEC failed to prevent falls in the real price 
of oil, most notably between 1960 and 1967, and between 1987 and 1997.  Yet, it 
managed recently to shift the market subjective view of the ‘comfortable’ price level 
from $18 per barrel to $25 per barrel; but it is too early to assess whether this is an 
ephemeral or fairly durable achievement. 
 
Our judgement is that OPEC’s existence has kept oil prices above marginal 
production costs, even when prices fell down to historically low levels.  Oil producing 
entities (be it countries or companies) were thus able to obtain a rent from the 
exploitation of oil resources.  This feature of OPEC’s performance, to our mind, is 
more significant than the occasional price shocks, which have never proved durable. 
 
Looking at the years ahead, it is reasonable to infer from this long history that OPEC 
will attempt (a) to prevent prices from falling when the world market suffers from a 
glut, (b) to reverse a price fall which it previously failed to prevent, and (c) to shift the 
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supply/demand balance seems to be tightening, or when member countries happen to 
place more value on revenues than on market share. 
 
There will be instances between today and the beginning of the next decade when 
significant increases in capacity in places such as Russia, Iraq, Nigeria, the Caspian or 
Venezuela coinciding with economic recession will put a strong downward pressure 
on prices.  And OPEC may not then be able to prevent some temporary fall but will 
attempt to reverse them as soon as market imbalances begin to recede. 
 
One or two political crises are likely to occur at some unpredictable date causing 
prices to rise sharply albeit temporarily.  Shocks, however, elicit responses in the form 
of both supply and demand adjustments.  Severe shocks cause governments to adopt 
energy conservation policies and to provide incentives for fuel substitution and for R 
& D for new fuels.  Severe shocks also push the world economy into recession, which 
in turn reduces demand for oil and energy in general.  Demand for oil is more strongly 
influenced by drops in income than by price rises at least in the short term. 
 
Price shocks may not cause a permanent upward shift in the oil price curve.  They 
usually take the form of a spike on a shift of relatively short duration of that curve.  
The more likely consequence of a shock of great intensity or long duration is the 
ushering in of a subsequent low-price episode. 
 
A gradual tightening of the oil supply/demand balance which could begin some time 
during the second decade of this century would enable OPEC to ‘sail with the wind’ 
and steer prices on a higher path.  This will not require the spending of very great 
effort because market conditions will be doing most of the work.  A wise OPEC 
should then disband since its members would continue to reap rewards without 
incurring blame.  But human nature being what it is the member countries would be 
reluctant to leave the stage and the limelight.  OPEC is at greater risk of collapse 
when the market remains affected for a long time by excess supplies than when the 
supply/demand balance underpins price stability, or a slow and gradual rising trend. 
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3.3 Economic Factors 
 
A cross-section analysis of oil production by country does not show a strong 
correlation with the size of countries’ reserves.  Put differently, R/P ratios vary 
considerably from one country to another.  R/P is as low as 6 or 8, offshore UK and 
Norway, as high as 80 or 100 in some of the Gulf countries.  The intensity of resource 
exploitation differs remarkably from one place to another. 
 
Production is a function of installed extraction, processing and lifting capacity; a 
function, in other words of investments made in the past and investments currently 
carried on to explore, develop fields and maintain wells and other plants.  An 
investment drive in attempts to discover new oil or for maintaining or developing 
further existing fields will either shift the oil supply curve to the right or at worse put 
the brake on a shift to the left. 
 
A failure to invest at the rate required by the growth of demand eventually gives rise 
to a situation of excess demand.  The supply/demand balances tightens and prices – 
whether OPEC exists or not – inevitably rise.  Of course such a tightening and price 
rises induce in turn adjustments either on the supply or the demand side or on both but 
time lags may be involved.  If the adjustments are delayed and  ex ante demand 
continues to expand against a temporarily inelastic supply curve a price shock will 
occur.  A careful analysis of the market conditions that prevailed in the few years 
preceding the 1973 shock shows that the rate of investment in capacity in the late 
1960s, early 1970s, although very high, was nevertheless insufficient relatively to the 
growth in world oil demand.  Capacity was not keeping pace.  And by 1972 or 1973 
shrewd observers realized that something had to give in and the something could only 
be the price.  With or without OPEC the oil price would have exploded.  The 
important difference that OPEC made is that it succeeded in holding the new price 
level during five years following 1973 (1974 to 1978 inclusive) despite the demand 
stagnation caused by the price shock.  The prices of other primary commodities that 
had risen four to five fold in 1972-3 collapsed immediately after because they were 
not supported by a cartel however weak or strong. 
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Failure to invest at a required rate is therefore a critical factor.  This failure can arise 
for a variety of reasons. 
 
•  In countries where the oil sector is largely or exclusively in the hands of a 
national oil corporation, the failure to invest is generally due to lack of funds 
and poor managerial resources. 
•  Access to countries with huge reserves is denied to private oil companies who 
have the resources to invest.  In some countries such as Mexico access is 
denied because oil nationalism is a fundamental element of the political and 
historical culture.  Oil nationalism plays also an important role in Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran and despite recent (widespread) views to the contrary it will 
play a role in liberated Iraq.  In some cases (Iran for example) access is not 
denied but the terms the country is prepared to concede to foreign investors are 
not attractive to profit-motivated commercial entities.   In other cases (e.g. 
Kuwait) negotiations for access have been dragging inconclusively for many 
years. 
•  Sanctions and embargoes have hindered oil investments in Libya, Iran and 
Iraq.  In punishing an oil-exporting country for some political misdeed, the 
superpowers may be inflicting costs onto themselves if not immediately at 
least in the longer term. 
•  Domestic political unrest, failure of economic development policies, guerrilla 
operations and the like, restrict the ability to invest of either the national on the 
private foreign company operating in the affected country.  This is the case of 
Colombia, Venezuela and to some extent Nigeria among others. 
•  Private oil companies under shareholders’ pressure to deliver value have been 
buying back their own shares (an easier way to give shareholders money than 
trying to achieve ambitious growth targets).  In doing so, however, they end up 
having fewer funds for allocation to their capex budgets. 
 
Shocks due to political crises such as wars or revolutions are spectacular and attract 
attention.  Failure to increase capacity to meet demand requirements in a future that is 
inevitably hazy when considered today is rarely noticed.  There will be times 




3.4 Technical Factors 
 
3.4.1 The impact of depletion on conventional oil supply 
 
Ever since oil was first produced in significant quantities over 140 years ago, debate 
has taken place on whether the oil will run out within the foreseeable future. 
Historically, near-term supply concerns arose when the relative rate of production 
capacity growth fell short of expected rates of demand growth. However, over time 
changing attitudes to oil supply and demand led to varying perceptions of whether the 
resource is in short supply or not. Changes in perception have switched around over 
very short periods of time depending on any particular event on either the supply side 
or the demand side. The only certainty on the supply side is the volume of oil that has 
actually been produced. 
 
The introduction of new exploration techniques to boost recovery rates, the revolution 
in computers which transformed seismic acquisition and processing, the technical 
innovations that enabled deepwater development and the opening up of new 
petroleum provinces that were previously closed due to political constraints have all 
led to a period of optimism that has weakened near term concerns about the 
exhaustibility of reserves. The fact that the private oil companies are struggling to 
replace reserves and are lowering targeted rates of production growth is giving rise to 
supply side concerns again which are probably unfounded at least in the near and 
medium term 
 
3.4.2 The entry of substitutes will mitigate supply constraints 
The issue as to how long oil supply can keep on rising to meet demand forecasts must 
ultimately take into account potential substitutes. On the one hand, if the variety of oil 
substitutes is limited, then depletion could result in significant problems for supply 
especially over the longer term. However, if new oil substitutes are developed and can 
be supplied at costs that are ultimately competitive with the existing oil supplies, then 
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energy industry has managed the transition from one fuel source to another without 
major supply side constraints. For example, coal substituted for firewood and 
petroleum substituted whale oil for illumination purposes. Furthermore, coal 
substituted for transportation and gas substituted for coal in domestic heating. Gas and 
coal are currently competing in the electrical generation sector with gas likely to be 
the winner.  
 
3.4.3 Oil reserves tend to be understated 
 
With any finite resource there will come a time when unfavourable economics will 
not permit further extraction. At present the global reserves life is 43 years based on 
current proven reserves and current levels of supply. However, this reserve life is 
based on proven conventional reserves alone and reserves can be labelled under a 
wide variety of physical, chemical and geological circumstances. There are also issues 
of definition as to what to include or exclude from a particular production forecast, as 
there are often constraints as to what oil reserves can and cannot be reported because 
of legal and political considerations. In addition, because there is no uniformity or 
stated policy as to the time period over which the existing technology and present 
economic conditions are anticipated to prevail reserve estimates are often inherently 
conservative.  
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The distribution of oil reserves can also be viewed as a pyramid with a small amount 
of higher quality reserves at the top but with an increasingly large amount of lower 
grade oil lower down. Naturally the cost of retrieving the resource increases lower in 
the pyramid making larger amounts or oil available at higher prices. The issue as to 
the total oil resource depends on where the pyramid is sliced and that this is a very 
subjective decision. There is a danger of circular reasoning if one divides the oil 
resource estimate by estimates of annual consumption since once the identified oil 
reserves have been depleted, there will always be a vast amount of oil reserves lower 
down the pyramid that may become economically viable to recover.  
 
Reserves definitions are by their very nature defined on a probabilistic approach  
rather than a deterministic approach. An initial declaration of recoverable oil that can, 
with reasonable certainty, be recovered in the future under existing economic and 
operating conditions is usually defined as the ‘proven’ reserves. However, all fields 
will also be declared as having additional volumes of ‘probable’ and ‘possible’ 
reserves. The definition of ‘proven’, ‘probable’ and ‘possible’ reserves varies across 
the literature and from country to country. ‘Proven’ reserves are usually defined as 
being P90 reserves, indicating that there is a greater than 90 per cent chance that the 
actual proven reserves base will be higher and a 10 per cent chance that it will be less. 
Similarly, probable and possible reserves can be defined as P50 and P10 reserves 
respectively. The important point here is that when oil reserve numbers are quoted in 
the literature, it must be realised that the numbers are probabilistic and in the case of 
proven reserves they are more than likely to be exceeded.  
 
In fact, there is a 90 per cent chance that initial reserves estimates of proven reserves 
will be exceeded. In addition, when such information is summed, eventually, to the 
regional and national level the simple arithmetic addition of a large number of 
independent values each representing the 90 per cent probability of a specified 
volume in a specific reservoir produces a higher joint probability of the total. It is for 
this reason that field growth and rates of field growth are well documented and are 
likely continue to be a major influence on additions to oil reserve numbers reported in 
the future. 
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Nearly every forecast of reserves since 1992 has been too low and that forecasts for 
different geographic regions are almost identical despite different fiscal systems, 
drilling levels and maturity. Recoverable resources are often assumed to be fixed, 
when in fact the amount of oil that can be recovered depends not only on the total 
amount of oil, but also dynamic variables like price, infrastructure and technology. If 
the amount of oil increases, as it has done in the past, then the level predicted for peak 
production must also increase and the date pushed further into the future. The 
methodology of deriving estimates of ultimate recoverable reserves from curves 
showing declining discovery size, moving towards the asymptote, does not take into 
account the fact that estimates of field size tend to increase through time.  
 
3.4.4 Upward revisions a consistent feature 
 
Upward revisions to reserves over the last five-year period have exceeded 150 billion 
barrels, 30 per cent more than actual consumption. Indeed, over the past fifteen years 
alone, reserve growth from existing fields has accounted for nearly 85 per cent of the 
additions of US reserves, and detailed studies show that additions to reserves from 
field growth are at least comparable to reserves derived from undiscovered resources. 
In addition, the total estimate of recoverable reserves is now 10 per cent higher than 
the total predicted some five years ago and as indicated above, further upward 
revisions can be expected. The United States Geological Survey (USGS) assessment 
of the development of field sizes also shows that reserves growth from existing fields 
is substantial. In fact in 2001, the USGS published a mean estimate of 612 billion 
barrels from revisions to previously booked oil reserves, significantly increasing their 
estimate of the world’s ultimate recoverable reserves of oil. This is not simply due to 
the booking of deepwater reserves in West Africa and the Gulf of Mexico, but is also 
due significant revisions to existing reserves as a result of improvement in recovery 
factors. Such changes are a demonstration that oil reserve lives estimates are by 
definition conservative. 
 
3.4.5 Forecasts of a global oil supply peak have been pessimistic  
 
In any analysis of the potential disruptions to the supply of oil, the key technical issue 
is identifying the time when global production reaches a peak. Many pessimists argue   55 
that that the likely peak of oil production would be between 2005 and 2010. However, 
economic factors could speed or delay the point at which oil production begins to 
decline. Such economic factors would include the level of investment in new 
developments and the potential for new technology to defer the timing of depletion. 
The fact that many commentators have consistently underestimated the volume of oil 
resources and that predictions for the peak of world oil production have always been 
some 10 years (on average) ahead of the current year gives ground for optimism that 
depletion issue are not a problem on the supply side in the near term and medium 
term. Oil supply constraints are more likely arise from lack of investment rather than a 
lack of opportunities. In addition, new production methods have always been 
discovered, and the ultimate constraint upon our capacity to enjoy unlimited supply of 
oil at acceptable prices is knowledge. As technology advances and costs are lowered, 
the proportion of reserves in a field that can be recovered economically rises and the 
size of fields that can be developed falls.  
 
3.4.6 Unconventional Oil Reserves 
 
Of course, all of the arguments outlined above refer to conventional oil reserves and 
ignore the potential from unconventional oil. Oil is considered to be unconventional if 
it is not produced from underground hydrocarbon reservoirs by means of production 
wells or if it need additional processing to produce a synthetic crude. More 
specifically, unconventional oil production usually includes the following sources: 
 
•  Oil shale 
•  Oil sands-based synthetic crude 
•  Coal-based liquid supplies 
•  Biomass liquid supplies 
•  Gas to liquid (GTL) supplies  
 
Most projections of future supplies of unconventional oil are based upon production 
from oil sand synthetic crude. At present this type of unconventional oil is projected 
to grow from 1.3 million barrels per day today to over 4.2 million barrels per day by 
2020 assuming that the economics remain at the same level as today. As a result,   56 
projects are expected to develop in anticipation of market needs with the gains coming 
primarily from oil sands in the Canadian province of Alberta, and from the Orinoco 
extra-heavy crude oil belt in Venezuela. 
 
Although natural bitumen and extra-heavy oil are worldwide in occurrence, a single 
extraordinary deposit in each category is dominant. The Alberta, Canada  natural 
bitumen deposits comprise at least 85% of the world total bitumen in place but are so 
concentrated as to be virtually the only such deposits that are economically 
recoverable for conversion to oil. Similarly, the extra-heavy crude oil deposit of the 
Orinoco Oil Belt, a part of the Eastern Venezuela basin, represents nearly 90% of the 
known extra-heavy oil in place.  
 
In Canada, the National Energy Board estimates that about 300 billion barrels of the 
2.5 trillion barrels of crude bitumen in the country may be ultimately recoverable. 
This is almost equivalent to the remaining reserves of conventional oil in Saudi 
Arabia. In Venezuela, Bitumines Orinoco, S.A. (BITOR) estimates that 1.2 trillion 
barrels of bitumen exsist in the Orinoco belt, of which about 270 billion barrels, are 
thought to be recoverable with current technology. Of course, the potential for future 
oil supply from unconventional oil supplies will in a large part be determined by the 
production costs. What is not in doubt though is the v ast potential of this resource 
base, which has to date largely remained untapped. 
 
3.4.7 Canadian Oil Sands 
The major deposits in Canada are in four geographic regions of Alberta at Athabasca, 
Wabasca, Cold Lake and Peace River. Although the existence of the tar sand was 
known in the 18
th century it was not until the first development plans for the Great 
Canadian Oil Sands (GCOS) was not conceived until 1962 and the ownership of the 
project passed on to Suncor.  
 
Suncor’s area of operation, 40 km north of Fort McMurray, is within the Athabasca 
deposits. The processing capability of the original Oil Sands Plant has been steadily 
increased and the expansion of the Steepbank Mine (on the opposite side of the 
Athabasca River) resulted in record production of 105 600 b/d in 1999. At the   57 
beginning of 1999 the company announced its "Project Millennium", a phased series 
of expansions to the Steepbank mine, adding bitumen extraction plants and increasing 
upgrader capacity. The first phase is expected to increase production to 130 000 b/d 
by 2001; the second phase to 225 000 b/d in 2003. In 2000, the establishment of an in-
situ project at Firebag (40 km north-east of the Oil Sands Plant) was announced. It is 
planned that Firebag, in conjunction with the open pit mining operation, will result in 
production reaching 260 000 b/d in 2004. Through a combination of mining and in-
situ development Suncor envisages an oil sands production of 400 000-450 000 b/d in 
2008.  
Syncrude, a joint venture with ten participants (Imperial Oil, a subsidiary of Exxon, is 
the majority shareholder with 25%) operates the Lake Mildred plant, also 40 km north 
of Fort McMurray. Production began in 1978 and, using open-pit mining methods, the 
shallow deposits are recovered for bitumen extraction and the production of upgraded 
crude oil. Gross production was 223 000 b/d in 1999. A new project – the Aurora 
mine - a 35 km extension from Lake Mildred, opened in August 2000. The mine’s 
output is partially processed on-site and then pipelined to the upgrader for further 
treatment. In 1999 the federal government approved a major expansion to Syncrude’s 
upgrading capacity and construction began in 2001. It is planned that the work under 
development will result in a capacity in the region of 350 000 b/d by 2004.  
Imperial Oil operates the Cold Lake oil sands deposits area. The company began 
commercial development in 1983 and has since gradually expanded facilities – total 
production of bitumen in 1999 was 132 000 b/d. Imperial plans to bring further 
expansion on stream so that by late 2002, bitumen production could be increased by 
30 000 b/d.  
Commercial production of Shell Canada’s Peace River in-situ deposits (north-western 
Alberta) began in 1986. Bitumen production capacity is set at approximately 12 000 
b/d although during 2000 the actual production from existing wells was considerably 
lower. In an attempt to boost declining bitumen production, Shell announced in late 
2000 a major expansion of production capacity. 
Albian Sands Energy, a joint venture, was created to build and operate the Muskeg 
River Mine on behalf of its owners: Shell Canada (majority shareholder, with 60%), 
Chevron Canada and Western Oil Sands (with 20% each). The mine, already under   58 
construction, is located 75 km north of Fort McMurray (Athabasca). In addition, a 
pipeline is to be constructed to link the mine to an upgrader to be built next to Shell’s 
Scotford refinery. The start-up of the project is scheduled for late-2002, with 
production of 155 000 b/d of bitumen.  
Taking into account all operations, total output from Canadian oil sands in 1999 was 
323 000 b/d of synthetic crude and 244 000 b/d of crude bitumen from the in-situ 
plants; together these represented 22% of Canada’s total production of crude oil and 
NGL. 
Supply costs cited by the Canadian National Energy Board include all costs associated 
with exploration, development and production. They also include capital costs, 
operating costs, taxes, royalties and a 10% real rate of return to the producer. The 
exploration costs to the producer are minimal as the location and the aerial extent of 
the oil sands have been well defined. 
 
Between the early 1980s and the late 1990s, operating costs fell from $22 to $10 per 
barrel through a continuous process of improvements and major recent improvements 
in truck-and-shovel mining and hydro transport. Industry analysts anticipate that 
further improvements in technology and operating methods may reduce operating 
costs to $7 per barrel by 2004 and to $6 per barrel by 2015. A table showing the 
current supply costs for oil-sand operations in Canada is shown below. 
 
Oil sands in-situ  Operating cost  Supply cost 
Primary recovery - Wabasca  $2 to $5  $5 to $8 
Primary recovery – Cold Lake  $5 to $7  $8 to $10 
Cyclic steam stimulation  $5 to $8  $8 to $12 
Oil sands - mining     
Integrated mining/upgrading  $8 to $9  $11 to $14 
Stand-alone upgraders  $8 to $9  $14 to $17 
Mining – no upgrading  $4 to $6  $8 to $10 
 
The indication of the increasing cost-competitiveness of Canadian unconventional oil 
sand production in the global oil market, and expectations that this will continue in the 
future, is provided by current investment in future projects. Publicly announced   59 
development plans for the period 1996 to 2010 amount to nearly $25 billion, of which 
about $5 billion was spent up to the second half of 2000. According the Canadian 
National Energy Board, production of synthetic crude and bitumen is forecast to 
almost triple to about 1.7 million barrels per day by 2015, which could represent over 
50% of Canada’s projected production at that time. With further cost reductions 
expected, likely projections of oil production from unconventional sources have the 
potential to surprise on the upside.  
 
3.4.8 Venezuelan Orinoco Heavy Oil and Bitumen 
The exploitation of the Orinoco Oil Belt is a matter of great concern to Venezuela and 
the subject of intense research relative to improved recovery. An interim technology, 
which permits recovery in the form of an emulsion, has proved successful. This 
emulsion, called Orimulsion, solves the production-transportation problem and 
eliminates refining by permitting the emulsion to be burned directly. Orinoco 
currently has a production capacity of 270,000 barrels per day of heavy crude, or 
about 14% of the country’s total production capacity.  
 
The long-term desire is to upgrade the extra-heavy oil to refinery feed, which will be 
economically advantageous. At present, there are four syncrude projects in different 
stages of development. Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company, has a 
minority interest in all four and all are at different stages of development:  
 
•  The Hamaca project (a joint venture between Phillips Petroleum, Texaco and 
PDVSA) has been delayed owing to financing problems. However, 
development is currently underway and it is planned to produce 190 000 b/d 
by 2003. 
•  The Sincor project, (a joint venture between TotalFinaElf, Statoil and 
PDVSA) started bitumen production in December 2000. Its upgrading plant 
came on stream in March 2002 and the project is expected to produce an 
average of 180 000 b/d this year.    60 
•  Production from the Petrozuata project, a joint venture between Conoco and 
PDVSA, has begun and had reached its target of 120 000 b/d by February 
2001. Work to enable production to increase to 150 000 b/d by 2003 is under 
way. An upgrader will process the 120 000 b/d of 9
o API oil, turning it into 
103 000 b/d of lighter, synthetic crude, some of which will be used as refinery 
feedstock to obtain gasoline and diesel for the domestic and export markets. 
The remainder will be shipped to the US for processing into higher-value 
products.  
•  The Cerro Negro is a joint venture project between ExxonMobil, Veba and 
PDVSA. Output rose from 60 000 b/d in 2000 to 120 000 b/d by March 2001, 
following the completion of a new coking unit.  
 
Total investments of about $12.8 billion are expected to produce 569,000 of synthetic 
crude capacity during the next three years, as production of light crude oil declines in 
the maturing fields in western Venezuela. The thick heavy oil from the Orinoco 
region must be diluted with lighter oil before it can be pumped through pipelines to 
the coast, where it is processed further. 
 
Operating costs for heavy oil form the Orinoco region are about $8 per barrel, 
including extraction and the cost of upgrading  it into lighter oil at a refinery. The 
actual operating cost of extracting the oil is not much different from that of 
conventional oil (about $3 per barrel in 2000), but the oil is so heavy that it has to be 
upgraded to a higher quality so it is saleable.  
 
However, the heavy oil projects are attractive because they also incur a lower income 
tax rate. Heavy oil production is taxed at 34%, rather than the normal rate of 62% 
incurred by traditional oil projects. All oil operations are however subject to royalty 
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3.4.9 Depletion implications in the short, medium and long term 
 
The evidence outlined above suggest that: 
 
•  In the near term, supply side disruptions due to depletion are unlikely on a 
global basis either on the ‘Low Growth’ or ‘High Growth’ scenarios, but 
might become an issue on a localised basis. Disruptions are more likely to be 
due to a lack of investment in new developments than any lack of 
opportunities and technology continues to drive down costs this will enable 
marginal oil reserves to be developed in the near term. 
 
•  In the medium term  (2020), supply side disruptions due to depletion are 
unlikely on a global basis on either the ‘Low Growth’ or ‘High Growth’ 
scenarios. Once again we believe that disruptions are more likely to be due to 
a lack of investment in new developments than any lack of opportunities. New 
investment will increasingly be required to replace capacity lost due to 
depletion effects. Estimates of the rate of depletion have in the past been 
greatly overestimated but given that over 70 per cent of current world oil 
supply comes from oilfields that were discovered prior to 1970 (fourteen of 
these fields produce over 20 per cent of the world’s total supply) management 
of the decline rates is likely to become of increasing importance in the future. 
The continued importance of technology will continue to drive down costs 
enabling marginal oil reserves to be developed. 
 
•  In the long term, there is a moderate probability that supply crisis  would 
emerge under the conditions of the ‘Low Growth’ scenario by 2040. On the 
demand side, it is probably wrong to project current rates of growth well into 
the future. Therefore the current reserves life of oil is deemed to be irrelevant 
especially in the context of a global reserves life that has risen to around forty-
three years despite the significant increase in global production. In addition, 
oil supply constraints could also be mitigated by the potential substitution of 
oil by gas (or even renewables). There have been 46 estimates made in the last 
35 years. Of those, 25 have ultimate oil reserves at 2000 Gb or more, including 
three, which are either at or just below the 3000 Gb level, and one at almost   62 
3500 Gb. Ten are at 1800 Gb and eight at between 1500Gb and 1800 Gb. 
However, although this reserves base is sufficient to meet even the most 
optimistic demand assumptions it is doubtful whether companies would be 
able to invest sufficient capital to meet such demand expectations. Therefore,  
under the  conditions of ‘High Growth’ scenario by 2040 there is every 
possibility that there could be a supply constraint. 
 
Ultimately, oil is a finite resource, but the real debate is not so much whether we are 
likely to significantly diminish the resource base within the next few decades but 
whether prices will fluctuate sufficiently to enable energy substitution. Clearly, 
volatility in the price of oil will sharpen the debate but this could actually cause 
unjustified near-term changes in investment patterns by industry and governments 
alike which will affect the long-term.  
 
4. Supply Disturbances and Supply Shifts 
 
4.1 Short-term (up to 2005) 
 
4.1.1 Scenario 1 
 Under both the ‘High Growth’ and ‘Low Growth’ scenarios, the most probable 
disturbance that may occur in the near future will be due to a war in Iraq.  The 
probability of a war is as high as 80 per cent.  The immediate impact will be a loss of 
2 million b/d of Iraqi oil in the world petroleum market.  Should Iraq succeed in 
retaliating on oil installations in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait (probability 10 per cent) oil 
prices will quickly rise to the $40 per barrel level.  If major damage is caused to these 
installations (probability less than 1.0 per cent) prices may well move higher, that is 
close to $45 or $50 per barrel and depending on the damage the duration of the price 
rise will be of the order of several months.  If Iraq fails to attack its neighbours, the 
military operation ends quickly and Saddam Hussein does not set the oil wells on fire, 
oil prices will quickly fall from the current $25 per barrel level to $20 or even $18 
d/b. 
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If the oil wells are set on fire and Saudi Arabia refuses to compensate for the lost 
output oil prices will hold for about a year at around $30 per barrel (probability 50 per 
cent).   
 
4.1.2 Scenario 2 
Under both the ‘Low Growth’ and ‘High Growth’ scenarios, terrorist action against 
oil instillations or tankers is possible (probability 30 per cent for oil fields, 60 per cent 
for pipelines, tankers and other isolated plants) but the p robability of major 




4.1.3 Scenario 3 
Under both ‘Low Growth’ and ‘High Growth’ scenarios, a revolution in Saudi Arabia 
between now and 2005 is unlikely (probably 5 per cent).  Political disturbances in Iran 
have a higher probability (20 – 25 per cent).  This may also be the case for Kuwait.  
Instability in Venezuela could well cause a production disruption in the next few 
months (probability 25 – 30 per cent).  The impact on oil price will be significant if 
the crisis occurs in Saudi Arabia.  In that case, however, the USA will intervene 
militarily to secure the oil fields. 
 
Problems elsewhere (Iran, Kuwait, Venezuela, etc) would have a greater impact 
because military intervention, save perhaps in Kuwait, is not  a realistic prospect.  
Thus the disturbance could last for a while and its impact aggravated if it coincided in 
time with a problem in Iraq or if two or three disturbances occurred at the same time 
in different places.  Probability of coincidence is less than 15 per cent but then prices 
could move up to $35 - $45 per barrel bracket. 
 
4.2 Medium-term (up to 2010) 
 
Under both the ‘Low Growth’ and ‘High Growth’ scenarios, the probability of a crisis 
in Saudi Arabia and indeed in other major Gulf countries (including Iran) increases 
with the passage of time.  But the period from 2005 to 2010 is one during which 
additional supplies may be reaching the market from the Caspian, the West African   64 
offshore and perhaps from a pacified Iraq.  Russian output would have built up in the 
immediately preceding years.  While the probability of a crisis increases the 
magnitude of the impact on prices may be mitigated by the increase in supply.  
 
Terrorism will continue to represent a threat (similar probability as for the short term) 
but the risk of serious damage is likely to diminish because of improved security 
measures.  
 
In the medium term, however, certain political forces relating to human rights, 
environmental issues, or an anti-corruption drive may have gained momentum.  Other 
things being equal these may restrict investments in capacity and restrict supplies.  
Economic difficulties in certain countries, not only in Latin America, Africa or 
Indonesia but also in Russia or the Caspian could restrict investment.  The overall 
supply situation will thus depend on the magnitude of the positive shifts due to new 
capacity compared with the negative shifts due to insufficient investment in new 
capacity or in workovers needed to fight natural decline in old fields. 
 
And as in all cases, the price impact of a supply shift depends also on the state of 
demand, which means that of the world economy at the time.  Prices may fall instead 
of rising when supply is falling if demand is reduced by a greater magnitude. 
Our view of the medium-term is one of fairly weak oil prices with the possibility of a 
price spike resulting from a political incident in Saudi Arabia.  During that incident 
whose probability is in the order of 20-25 per cent prices could well climb to $50 per 
barrel. The risk of a political incident in Saudi Arabia is more likely under the ‘Low 
Growth’ scenario, which envisages flat real oil prices 
 
4.3 Long-term (up to 2040) 
 
The very long-term problem is one of oil depletion and the rate at which fuel 
substitutes and new fuel-using types of engines are developed and enter the market.  
But this is a problem that will begin to be felt around 2020 or a bit later.  The period 
between 2015 and 2020 or 2025 could witness the beginnings of a tighter supply 
situation because the big increases from Iraq, Russia, West Africa and Venezuela 
would have occurred in earlier years.  Oil prices will then rise and stimulate R & D   65 
substitutes, actual substitution and reduction in demand.  In other words this would be 
a period leading to major adjustments in the longer term (2025 – 2040). The risk of 
supply disruption in the longer term due to depletion is much more likely under the 
‘High Growth’ scenario than under the ‘Low Growth’ scenario. 
 
 
5. Policy Responses of Importing Countries 
 
In the past 30 years, following the 1973 and 1979-80 oil price shocks, governments of 
importing countries have adopted energy policies aimed at reducing their dependence 
on oil imports. A lower degree of dependence can be achieved either by reducing the 
level of oil consumption (and if this is impossible at least its expected rate of growth) 
or by increasing the volume of domestic production, an action which naturally is only 
available to countries with oil resources. Reducing the level, or the rate of growth of 
oil consumption, can in turn be achieved by either inter-fuel substitution or increased 
efficiency in the use of oil. Host governments, the USA remaining the major 
exception however, used excise taxes to curb consumption of gasoline and other 
automotive fuels and subsidies to encourage the development and the use of non-oil 
fuels such as coal or nuclear. In some cases, they provided incentives to improve the 
efficiency of oil or more generally energy using structures, engines or appliances. The 
determination with which governments designed and implemented energy policies 
varies significantly from country to country and from time to time. 
  
In our view, the issue of supply security has been given exaggerated importance by 
both the USA and the EU. There are of course risks as in any area of human activity. 
Dependence on imports is a feature of a world where nations trade, and increased 
globalisation believed by economists and politicians to enhance the welfare of all 
societies will increase import dependence all round. 
 
The oil issue is complicated immensely by political factors, the emotions that some of 
them elicit, the memory of the 1973 embargo which hurt the pride of industrialised 
countries because they were aggressed by developing nations. 
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It is difficult to disentangle the subjective elements from the positive factors that 
underlie the perceptions of risks. It is up to governments to decide on the cost/benefit 
of measures that mitigate risks. This assessment is bound to differ from one 
government or country t o another. Japan, for example has a high degree of risk 
aversion for its considerable dependence on oil imports from the Middle East. 
Diversification of import sources is no solution, as it would only reduce the degree of 
dependence by a few percentage points. So Japan opted for (a) energy conservation, 
(b) diversification of the energy mix with increased reliance on coal, nuclear and 
natural gas and (c) on building up a huge precautionary stockpile of oil. 
 
Energy conservation if implemented rationally is a win-win situation but diminishing 
returns will set in at some point. You can increase energy efficiency but cannot do 
without energy. Fuel substitution has run into problems because of small nuclear 
accidents, and because of the lack of a good domestic infrastructure for gas. Coal is 
not environmentally friendly. The Japanese stockpile is much too big and therefore 
involves unjustifiable costs. 
 
The US policy includes a strategic stock. The US government favours a supply as 
against a demand solution to the security problem. But how to develop nuclear against 
public opinion objections? The US wants to reduce dependence on oil imports from 
the Middle East. A switch to Mexico, Venezuela and Canada in the Western 
Hemisphere will not lead to much increase in the volume of oil imported from these 
sources in the short run. These countries do not have surplus capacity and their ability 
to switch export destinations in favour of the USA is very limited because they 
already export most of their tradable oil to the USA. Switching to Nigeria, Russia or 
Iraq is akin to trading one set of risks for another, albeit to slightly lesser ones. 
The EU is in favour of conservation and energy efficiency. 
 
It is important to distinguish two different situations and adopt measures that are 
appropriate to each case. 
 
•  The first situation is a significant supply disruption as in 1973. The appropriate 
measure in this case is a strategic stock but it is essential to also have a clear 
and credible system of release in an emergency.   67 
 
•  The second case is one in which oil supplies begin to decline in the long run. 
The policy measure that is most appropriate in this case is subsidies for the 
development of non-conventional oil and liquids from gas plus subsidies for 
R&D in such fields as car engines and hydrogen, and policy measures to 
improve energy efficiency. Other solutions such as development of solar or 
wind energy will not solve radically the energy problem. 
 
There is, of course, a major difference between what constitutes the appropriate 
policies and those that are likely to be actually applied. The importing countries’ 
actual response to future oil shocks and to a possible long term supply tightening will 
depend on the nature of the event, perceptions about the expected length of the risks, 
the likelihood of repetitions and, in many instances, on a host of domestic and 
international political, economic and public opinion factors. 
 
Policy responses would probably be close to the appropriate ones defined above, if 
they were only related to the exact nature of a crisis, and based on an objective 
appreciation of its expected duration and the chances of the crisis being a one-off 
event or the first in a future sequence of events. 
 
Governments, however, may over-react to a temporary crisis, which may well turn-
out to be one-off, and introduce costly policies that favour inter-fuel substitution in 
favour of coal and nuclear for example, because a new oil crisis would have 
confirmed political public opinion on its view that oil is an insecure energy source and 
that the Middle East is an insecure region of the world.  
 
Some US lobbies are arguing already in favour of a switch in the sources of US oil 
imports away from the Middle East and towards Russia, the Caspian, Latin America 
and or West Africa. A crisis may cause the US government to adopt such a policy. 
The drawback is that by reducing its dependence on oil imports from the Middle East 
the US will inevitably increase the dependence of other countries, notably its 
European allies. Furthermore, the switch will cause some ‘frictions’ until full 
adjustments in supply take place and therefore a further temporary rise in oil price. 
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Governments are always inclined to favour fiscal policies as a means to limit the 
demand for oil and, other things being equal, to reduce imports. The first reaction to a 
crisis is likely to be an increase in excise taxes on automotive fuels. This is preferred 
to subsidies to alternative fuels or research and development since taxes bring in 
revenues whereas subsidies are an expense. There are instances, however, where 
encouraging new supplies is more effective than discouraging demand. 
 
Government’s responses will be more drastic should the crisis cause physical 
shortages in the consumer’s markets. Long queues at petrol stations, electricity 
blackouts are much more explosive politically than price rises that take the barrel to 
the $40 to $45 level. One should recall that governments, again with the exception of 
the US, could easily mitigate the impact on consumers of a price rise by lowering the 
excise tax rate. Many can mitigate physical shortages by releasing oil from strategic 
stocks. The paradox of emergency stocks is that they are rarely used in an emergency 
because governments fear that an unfolding crisis may involve even greater 
emergencies in the near future. The development and the severity of a crisis is only 
fully known when it ends. 
 
A situation can arise where several OECD governments decide to hasten the decline 
of oil from the energy slate with ambitious programmes to develop substitutes. Such a 
plan was introduced in the US in the 1970s but was abandoned when oil prices began 
to fall. Well, almost by definition prices fall after a shock, and money conscious 
governments beset by other calls on budgets would abandon expensive schemes, as 
has happened in the past. Serious and sustained attempts to free a country from oil 
will only be made if the trauma, political and economic, of a crisis is extensive and 
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On a global scale, coal is still significant with a contribution to primary energy 
demand that is at present only exceeded by oil. Although coal reserves are vast and 
are widely dispersed, consumption is increasingly concentrating in a small number of 
countries and in a few main uses. As a result, concerns over coal supply security are 
likely to remain minimal especially as almost half of current reserves are located in 
OECD countries. 
  
The continuing use of coal in all its markets is threatened by environmental concerns 
reflected in tightening regulations and international agreements. Coal is particularly 
vulnerable as it contributes 38 per cent of the world’s total carbon emissions from 
commercial fuels, and is also a major source of sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxides 
emissions as well as particulates and other environmental hazards. 
1 
 
2. The Key Exporting Countries 
 
2.1 Coal Resource Base 
 
Coal reserves are vast and are widely dispersed (Table 1). Nearly 50 per cent of 
proved world coal reserves are found in the leading three countries (United States, 
Russia and China). In turn, at 2001 rates of production, the reserve to production ratio 
is over 200 years, particularly in the case of the Russian Federation. Even if one 
assumed the most optimistic growth estimates for the demand for coal the reserves to 
production ratio is still expected to remain above 100 years by 2040. The IEA 
currently estimates coal demand to rise by 1.7% annually such that 117 billion tonnes 
will be consumed in the period up to and including 2020, compared to current reserve 
estimates in excess of one trillion tonnes. This reserves base has also grown by 50 per 
cent over the past 22 years. 
 
Of course, these numbers hide large variations in terms of accessibility, quality and 
cost.  The quality and geological characteristics of coal production are more important   71 
than the actual size of the deposits. For example, Australia, Canada and the United 
States all have high quality coking coal. Table 1 shows that coal reserves are far more 
evenly distributed around the world than oil or gas. This is the first key point in terms 
of security of supply. 
 
Another key point is that, as Table 2 shows, 45 per cent of world proved coal reserves 
are located in politically mature and stable OECD countries with OECD North 
America accounting for 26 per cent of the world’s proven reserves base. Russia and 
China hold a further 27.5% of world reserves. In view of their increasing integration 
into the global economy it can be reasonably concluded that approximately three-
quarters of total world coal reserves are located in reliable countries. 
 










United States  250.0  25.4  246 
Russian Federation  157.0  15.9  > 500 
China  114.5  11.6  105 
India  84.4  8.6  246 
Australia  82.1  8.3  261 
Germany  66.0  6.7  326 
South Africa  49.5  5.0  220 
Ukraine  34.2  3.5  407 
Kazakhstan  34.0  3.5  431 
Poland  22.2  2.3  136 
Brazil  11.9  1.2  > 500 
Others   78.7  8.0   
TOTAL WORLD  984.5  100.0  216 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2002.   72 








OECD Europe  104.5  10.6 
OECD North America  258.0  26.2 
OECD Asia/Pacific  83.5  8.5 
OECD Total  445.9  45.3 
Russian Federation  157.0  15.9 
China  114.5  11.6 
India  84.4  8.3 
Latin America  21.8  2.2 
Africa  55.4  5.6 
Middle East  1.7  0.2 
Others  20.3  2.1 
Total World  984.5  100.0 
 
Source: International Energy Agency, Coal Information 2001. 
 
 
2.2 Historical and Current Supply of Coal 
 
Total world coal production increased sharply from 1979 to 1989 but the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union set off a sharp decline in total coal production resulting in a 
steady decline in world coal production from 1990 to 1993. Global production 
recovered slowly from 1994 to 1997, but declined in the next three years. Recent 
declines in world production can be attributed to the following factors: 
 
•  China has been rationalising its hard-coal production by closing small 
uncompetitive mines and reducing coal consumption in some urban industrial, 
household and commercial markets. 
 
•  France, Germany, Poland and Spain have programmes to reduce heavily 
subsidised coal production.   73 
 
•  Low world and domestic coal prices dampened incentives to increase coal 
production in some of the major producing and exporting countries, including 
the United States. 
 
The major coal producers in 2001 are shown in Table 3 along with their share of total 
world production. 
 
Table 3 - Major 10 Coal Producers (m tonnes) 
 
Country  1991  1996  2001  2001  
%  
China  1084.3  1374.1  1089.7  23.9 
United States  903.5  965.2  974.0  21.3 
India  239.9  311.0  343.5  7.5 
Australia  219.6  256.1  315.0  6.9 
Russia  353.3  256.7  269.0  5.9 
South Africa  178.4  206.3  224.1  4.9 
Germany  345.9  235.1  203.5  4.5 
Poland  209.8  201.7  163.4  3.6 
Indonesia  13.8  50.4  92.6  2.1 
Ukraine  135.6  75.7  83.9  1.8 
Total World  4586.3  4718.8  4563.7  100.0 
 
 
The major coal exporters are shown in Table 4 below. This highlights the fact that 
over 60% of world exports are derived from OECD countries where the risks of 
supply disruptions are likely to be minimal. The top five exporters of coal accounted 
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Table 4: Major Coal Exporters (m tonnes) 
 
Country  1991  1996  2001  2001  
%  
Australia  113.2  138.6  194.4  28.4 
China  20.0  36.5  87.1  21.8 
South Africa  47.4  60.2  69.8  17.5 
Indonesia  7.6  36.4  64.5  16.2 
United States  98.8  82.1  44.1  11.1 
Colombia  16.4  24.8  38.0  9.5 
Russia  37.4  25.3  22.1  5.8 
Canada  34.1  34.4  30.1  7.5 
Poland  19.5  28.9  24.6  6.2 
Total World  398.9  513.2  615.9  100.0 
 
Australia is the world’s largest coal exporter and increased its exports by 5% in 2000 
to 163.7 million tonnes of coal equivalent (mtce). Australia’s share of the world’s 
seaborne trade was 32% in 2000. High quality, low sulphur coking and thermal coals 
are shipped to major markets in Asia (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and to Europe. 
Sales to Asian markets were 143.8 mtce. In 2000 Australia increased its exports of 
coking coal by 6.9&% over 1999 to 99.6 mtce. Thermal coal exports in 2000 
increased by 9.7% to 87.1 mtce. 
 
Japan is Australia’s main market and in 2000 86.6 mtce were shipped to Japan, an 
increase of 9% compared to 1999. South Korea remained Australia’s second largest 
coal market in 2000. However, exports fell by 5% in 2000 to 21.8 mtce mainly due to 
competition in the thermal coal market from China and Indonesia. Taiwan was 
Australia’s third largest market with exports increasing 16% to 16.3 mtce. 
 
China is the second largest exporter of coal with a large range of coal types being 
produced for both domestic and export markets. Coal is the most important energy 
source for the domestic market supplying 70 per cent of China’s basic energy needs. 
In 2000, China exported 10 per cent of its production, well above official targets with   75 
most being directed to the north Asian markets. Only minor volumes were sold to 
European markets. 
 
South Africa is the third largest exported of coal with most being sent to utilities and 
industrial customers in Europe, because of the freight advantage that it has to that 
market. Since sanctions were lifted in 1993, there has been a steady increase in export 
volume. In 2000, Europe accounted for 63 per cent of South African thermal coal 
exports.   
 
Exports of coal from Indonesia have been growing steadily despite the continuing 
political and economic crises in the country. By 2000 over 75 per cent of coal 
produced was exported. Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan were the most important 
destinations for Indonesian coal exports. 
 
The USA is estimated to contain over 29 per cent of the world’s coal resources. It has 
a well-developed modern infrastructure, strong domestic demand and excess export 
capacity available.  It is therefore no surprise that the USA is known as the ‘swing 
supplier’ in the international coal trade, with export volumes fluctuating by as much 
as 25 per cent as was the case in 1993. The majority of USA coal exports are of high 
quality, and are exported, to major markets in Europe, Brazil, Japan and Korea.   
 
2.3 Near term coal supply 
 
Under both the ‘Low Growth’ and the ‘High Growth’ scenarios that near term supply 
of coal is not considered to be an issue. The resource base is such that prices are 
expected to remain under pressure in the short, medium and long term. Substantial 
cost-cutting efforts through industry concentration and productivity gains have served 
to add to the already vast r eserves base. In addition, the role of the US in world 
markets as the short-run swing producer is expected to continue for many years. 
Although exports from the USA represent just 10 per cent of the country’s total 
production, mines can be quickly brought  back into operation and production 
increased when exports seem likely to earn more money than the local market, and 
vice versa. The importance of North America in world markets is expected to 
encourage capital investment in coal production for at least the next two decades.    76 
 
2.4 Medium- and long-term supply of coal 
 
Under both the ‘Low Growth’ and the ‘High Growth’ scenarios that medium term 
supply of coal is not considered to be an issue. The importance of North America in 
world markets is expected to encourage capital investment in coal production for at 
least the next two decades.  Supply costs are forecast to remain lowest in those OECD 
countries where new technology has been adopted in order to lower extraction costs 
and increase productivity.  
 
3. Potential supply disruptions 
 
The key exporting countries in 2001 were Australia, China, South Africa, Indonesia 
and the USA. Together these countries made up over 90 per cent of 2001 exports. In 
this section we focus on the potential supply disruptions that could occur paying 
particular attention to these five exporting countries. 
 
3.1 Economic impacts 
 
The potential supply disruptions due to economic factors relate mainly to price. In this 
respect the international coal market plays a crucial role in price s etting. Because 
domestic coal industry performance is increasingly assessed against the standards of 
the international market, prices set by buyers and sellers in the international market 
will affect domestic energy production and consumption decisions. In addition, prices 
in the two key regional markets, Europe-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific, move in close 
relationship. With the increasing importance of the global coal market it seems likely 
that the current system of long-term supply contracts will decline in importance in 
coming years. 
 
In the absence of any cartel in the coal industry, the impact of a developing spot 
market in coal will tend to drive down prices. As a result it is likely that the industry 
will continue to concentrate on those areas where the supply costs are lowest and 
where productivity is highest. Not surprising the major exporters with these attributes 
are the OECD exporters, including the USA. It is therefore very unlikely that the   77 
development of a more dynamic pricing mechanism will result in any near or long 
term supply disruptions in the global coal market. 
 
3.2 Geopolitical impacts 
 
The substantial resource base combined with the wide variety of producers from 
mainly OECD countries means that potential supply disruptions from geopolitical 
factors are likely to remain minimal. The fact that the USA is likely to remain the coal 
‘swing producer’ in the short-, medium-, and long-terms means that potential 
disruptions could be made up in relative quickly without any long lasting effect on 
prices. 
 
3.3 Institutional impacts 
 
The key uncertainty affecting future coal uses is the impact of environmental policies 
on demand. Governments are imposing increasingly strict requirements on the coal 
supply chain, from mining to transport, and on the use of coal in power generation and 
steel making. Therefore, the coal-supply and price outlook hinges on the effect of new 
environmental and climate change policies on demand prospects. Investors may show 
a reluctance to commit to the large resources necessary to ensure a sufficient coal 
supply in the current landscape if long term demand is placed at risk by the possible 
introduction of environmental and climate change policies.  
 
Environmental pressures are unlikely to result in any near term disruptions, as it will 
have more of any effect on demand than on supply. However, lower demand for coal 
will ultimately have an impact on coal prices, which in turn could affect long-term 
investments. However, the development of new technology to reduce emissions could 
mitigate many of the environmental arguments. 
 
Another institutional impact relates to subsidies in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries. A number of OECD countries provide subsidies in order to sustain 
domestic production, particularly within Europe. Although  plans exist to reduce 
subsidies in many OECD countries by 2005, they will not be completely eliminated 
and may actually be used to maintain access to coal reserves in order to maintain   78 
security of supply. Reduction in subsidies might lead to a further round of mine 
closures in OECD countries but this is unlikely to be of major importance in the 
global context. 
 
3.4 Technical impacts 
 
The rate at which clean-coal technologies are adopted and the scope at which they are 
put into place will both be critical for future coal use. The cost of environmental 
protection for new supply projects or retrofitting existing plants is a causing a growing 
level of uncertainty. Clean coal technologies can result in significant gains in 
efficiency and reductions in emission levels but these gains come at a price. However, 
it is likely that environmental pressures to reduce emissions are likely to force the 
industry into accelerating efforts to implement new technologies in order to meet 
carbon-emission targets. Such measures are likely to partially mitigate the impact of 
institutional pressures to reduce coal supplies.  
 
3.5 Extreme combinations 
 
Given the rich resource base of coal and diversity of the resource base, it is considered 
that supply disruptions will occur only in the most exceptional circumstances. Such 
circumstance could occur if two or more of the factors discussed above combine. 
Such a combination could include an embargo on coal exports from China, at the 
same time as political instability in South Africa stops coal production and a strike by 
train drivers in the USA (the main mode of transporting coal from mines) prevents 
that country from making up any supply deficit. However, such a combination is only 
is considered extremely unlikely. 
 
4. Affect on prices of supply disturbances 
 
There is an impression given that coal use is rapidly fading into history. The reality, in 
recent years, is that its overall consumption has remained robust. Although the 
geographical pattern of consumption and the pattern of end use have changed nearly 
two-thirds of total world coal consumption is accounted for in just four countries 
namely China, United States, India and Russia. However, as we have shown the   79 
potential for supply disruptions is very minimal as the volume of remaining reserves 
remains high with OECD countries accounting for over 60 per cent of exporting 
countries. In addition, the USA is expected to remain the swing producer for coal in 
the longer-term. 
 
The key potential supply disturbance that we have identified relates to environmental 
pressure and the impact that this could have on demand. The greater the 
environmental pressure on the industry the greater the likelihood that this could lead 
to downward pressure on prices in the medium-term. In the longer-term this could 
affect investment decisions and put upward pressure on prices. However, this upward 
pressure could be fully mitigated by improvements in technology, the constant 




The term “coal” is normally divided into four categories 
 
•  Anthracite 
•  Bituminous Coal 
•  Sub-Bituminous Coal 
•  Lignite/Brown Coal 
 
In turn the International Coal Classification of the Economic Commission for Europe 
(UN/ECE) recognises two broad categories of coal: 
 
Hard Coal 
Coal of gross calorific value greater than 5,700 kcal/kg (23.9 GJ/t) on an ash-free but 
moist basis and with a mean random reflectance of vitrinite of at least 0.6. It is the 
sum of coking coal and steam coal. 
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Brown Coal 
Non-agglomerating coal with a gross calorific value less than 5,700 kcal/kg (23.9 
GJ/t) containing more than 31 per cent volatile matter on a dry mineral matter free 
basis. It is the sum of sub-bituminous coal and lignite.   81 




The current demand for uranium can be met by primary production of uranium and by 
secondary sources from stockpiles and inventories. The uranium resource base is large 
enough to support even the most optimistic of demand assumptions and the reserves 
are located mainly in OECD countries. In the near-term, primary and secondary 
uranium resources will be able to meet both optimistic and pessimistic demand 
forecasts. In the medium-term, secondary sources will be depleted but current 
production and current developments of primary uranium should be sufficient to 
supply both optimistic and pessimistic demand forecasts. In the long-term, significant 
new sources of uranium will need to be developed to meet rising demand. This will 
require significantly higher prices to justify new investment.  
 
In the near term, the real risks to supply could come from disruptions in secondary 
supplies of uranium. Such disruptions are likely to be short-lived and cause spikes in 
the uranium price. In the longer term, economic factors are more likely to cause 
supply disruptions if prices do not recover to levels that justify new investment 
decisions. However, political factors and the introduction of new technology could 
suppress demand for uranium if the nuclear industry goes into decline.  
   
2. The key exporting countries 
2.1 Uranium resource base 
The uranium resource base can be divided into primary and secondary supplies. 
Primary uranium resources consist of deposits that are produced by conventional 
techniques, 40 per cent by open pit mining, 33 per cent by underground mining and 
the rest through modern techniques, including in situ leaching. Secondary uranium 
resources consist of inventories, stockpiles and recycled materials. 
 
2.1.2 Primary uranium resource base 
Estimates of remaining reserves of uranium have been divided into several categories 
reflecting the different levels of confidence in the quantities reported to the Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA). The resources are broadly classified as either conventional or    82 
 
Figure 1: Reasonably assured resources (RAR) (in 1000 tonnes U, as of 1 January 
2001) 
Source: IAEA (2002) 
COUNTRY                                                                          Cost Ranges      
   <USD 40/kgU USD 40-80/kgU < USD 80/kgU USD 80-130/kgU < 130/kgU
Algeria        26.00 0.00 26.00
Argentina  2.64 2.44 5.08 2.00 7.08
Australia  654.00 13.00 667.00 30.00 697.00
Brazil  56.10 105.90 162.00 0.00 162.00
Bulgaria  2.22 5.61 7.83 0.00 7.83
Canada  277.99 36.57 314.56 0.00 314.56
Central Africa Republic  0.00 0.00 8.00 8.00 16.00
Chile  NA NA NA NA NA
Congo, Democratic Republic of        1.80 0.00 1.80
Czech Republic  0.00 2.37 2.37 0.00 2.37
Denmark  0.00 0.00 0.00 27.00 27.00
Finland  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 1.50
France  0.19 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.19
Gabon  4.83 0.00 4.83 0.00 4.83
Germany  0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
Greece  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Hungary  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
India  NA NA NA NA NA
Indonesia  0.00 0.47 0.47 6.33 6.80
Italy        4.80 0.00 4.80
Islamic Republic of Iran  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49
Japan  0.00 0.00 0.00 6.60 6.60
Kazakhstan  317.23 115.56 432.76 162.04 594.83
Malawi        11.70 0.00 11.70
Mexico           1.70 1.70
Mongolia  10.60 51.00 61.60 0.00 61.60
Namibia  61.83 82.04 143.87 31.24 175.10
Niger  10.91 18.69 29.60 0.00 29.60
Peru        1.79 0.00 1.79
Portugal        7.45 0.00 7.45
Romania              4.55
Russian Federation  63.00 75.00 138.00 0.00 138.00
Slovenia  0.00 2.20 2.20 0.00 2.20
Somalia           6.60 6.60
South Africa  119.20 111.90 231.10 59.90 291.00
Spain  0.00 2.46 2.46 2.46 4.92
Sweden  0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00
Thailand              0.01
Turkey  0.00 9.13 9.13 0.00 9.13
Ukraine  19.25 23.35 42.60 38.40 81.00
United States  NA   104.00 244.00 348.00
Uzbekistan  90.08 0.00 90.08 25.27 115.35
Viet Nam  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.34 1.34
Zimbabwe  NA NA 1.80 0.00 1.80
Total  1691.07 657.69 2516.07 661.87 3182.52  83 
Figure 2: Estimated additional resources (EAR) –Category I (in 1000 tonnes U, as of 
1 January 2001) 
COUNTRY                                                                          Cost Ranges      
   <USD 40/kgU USD 40-80/kgU < USD 80/kgU USD 80-130/kgU < 130/kgU
Algeria  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Argentina  2.03 0.35 2.38 6.18 8.56
Australia  185.00 11.00 196.00 37.00 233.00
Brazil        100.20 0.00 8.40
Bulgaria  2.20 6.20 8.40 0.00 8.40
Canada  102.81 19.58 122.39 0.00 122.39
Central Africa Republic  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chile  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Congo, Democratic Republic of        1.70 0.00 1.70
Czech Republic  0.00 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.31
Denmark        0.00 16.00 16.00
Finland  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France  0.00 0.00 0.00 11.74 11.74
Gabon  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Germany  0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00
Greece        6.00 0.00 6.00
Hungary  0.00 0.00 0.00 18.40 18.40
India  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indonesia  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70 1.70
Italy  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Islamic Republic of Iran  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.88
Japan  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.30
Kazakhstan  113.20 82.70 195.90 63.40 259.30
Malawi  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mexico  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.70
Mongolia  11.00 10.00 21.00 0.00 21.00
Namibia  70.55 20.27 90.82 16.70 107.51
Niger  11.17 14.36 25.53 0.00 25.53
Peru        1.86 0.00 1.86
Portugal  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.45 1.45
Romania              4.69
Russian Federation  17.20 19.30 36.50 0.00 36.50
Slovenia        5.00 5.00 10.00
Somalia        0.00 3.40 3.40
South Africa  48.10 18.70 66.80 9.60 76.40
Spain  0.00 0.00 0.00 6.38 6.38
Sweden  0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 6.00
Thailand              0.01
Turkey  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ukraine     20.00 20.00 30.00 50.00
United States  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uzbekistan  46.80 0.00 46.80 9.97 56.71
Viet Nam  NA NA 1.10 5.64 6.74
Zimbabwe  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total  611.06 222.77 949.69 255.44 1117.96
  Source: IAEA (2002) 
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Figure 3: Major Uranium Resource Holders (January 1, 2001)  
Source: IAEA (2001) 
 
unconventional. Conventional resources are those resources that have an established 
history of production where uranium is either a primary product or and important by-
product. Very low-grade resources or those from which uranium is only recovered as 
a minor by-product are considered to be unconventional resources. 
 
The NEA also subdivides conventional resources into four different confidence levels 
of occurrence. These include reasonably assured reserves (RAR) which have a high 
assurance of existence, estimated additional resources (EAR-I) that are inferred to 
occur in extensions to well-explored deposits, estimated additional resources (EAR-II) 
that are believed to exist on trend and finally speculative reserves (SR) which are 
thought to exist on the basis of extrapolation rather than any direct evidence. 
 
The NEA further divides the uranium resource base into categories based on the cost 
of production. These categories are defined as: USD 40kg/kgU or less, USD 
80kg/kgU or less, and USD 130/kgU or less. The costs include all direct and indirect 
costs associated with mining, processing and transportation.  
 
For the purposes of this report we have focused on the reasonably assured resources 
(RAR) and the estimated additional resources (EAR-I). These resources are tabulated  
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Source: IAEA 2002 
 
 
Figure 7: Primary and Secondary Sources of Uranium 2001 
Source: IAEA 2002 
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in Figures 1 and 2, which show that the most significant resource holders at the end of 
2001 were Australia and Kazakhstan, which together accounted for nearly 50 per cent 
of known remaining resources (Figure 3).  Canada is the third largest resource holder 
and is followed closely by South Africa. The US is also an important resource holder 
although the data suggests that its resources are limited to reasonably assured 
reserves.  Other major resource holders include Namibia, Brazil, the Russian 
Federation, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Mongolia and Niger. Figure 4 plots the resource 
holders’ cumulative interest in the total estimated uranium resource base at the end of 
2001. This chart shows that uranium deposits in Australia, Kazakhstan and Canada 
account for over 50% of remaining reserves and that the top ten resource holders 
account for over 90% of the resource base. Figures 5 and 6 separate the uranium 
resource into the RAR and EAR-I categories. As one would expect the countries with 
the largest RAR resource are also the ones with the largest EAR-I resources. 
 
The tables demonstrate that uranium resources are abundant and that most (45%) lie 
within OECD countries with the exception of Kazakhstan. In addition, the figures 
illustrate that most resources can be extracted at a cost of less than USD 80 per kg 
 
2.1.2 Secondary sources of uranium 
 Secondary sources of uranium include inventories, stockpiles and recycled materials. 
Utility companies, fuel-cycle companies and government bodies own most uranium 
inventories. Secondary sources of uranium are relatively cheap to store and they are 
held for a variety of reasons, the most important being to enhance security of nuclear 
power supply, to guarantee delivery schedules, and to hedge against variations in the 
price of uranium. The World Nuclear Association has evaluated inventories and 
estimates that there are over 215,000 tonnes of uranium held in stockpile globally, 
excluding any military stockpiles.  
 
Disarmament agreements between the FSU and the US rendered large quantities of 
high-enriched uranium (HEU) surplus to requirements. At the end of 2001 the FSU 
was estimated to have produced 1400 tonnes of HEU, one third of which is currently 
being delivered to the US in a low-enriched form. In total the volume of HEU in the 
market is equivalent to some 40,000 tonnes of uranium.  
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There are also large stockpiles of depleted uranium, known as ‘enrichment tails’. 
Depleted uranium is a by-product of the uranium enrichment process and at the end of 
2000, it was estimated that there were some 1.2 million tonnes of depleted uranium 
stocks with over 80 per cent held by the US and the FSU. 
 
2.2 Historical and current supply of uranium 
Global production of uranium in recent years has consistently fallen over the past 20 
years as falling demand and a significant supply of secondary uranium have combined 
to depress prices. By 2001 primary uranium was produced in 23 countries with OECD 
countries accounting for over 56 per cent of global production. Primary uranium 
supply accounted for nearly 60 per cent of total supply with the various sources of 
secondary supplies making up 40 per cent (Figure 7) 
 
The leading producers of primary uranium in 2001 were Canada and Australia (Figure 
8). Together these two countries produced over 70% of global primary uranium 
supply. Each of these countries produced over three times the annual volume of Niger, 
the FSU, Namibia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A detailed breakdown of annual 
production is provided in Figure 9. The US is also a major producer but many of its 
mills and mines have been mothballed and are operating on a standby basis only. 
 
The four uranium-producing countries of the FSU, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine, contributed nearly 20% of global production in 2001. Although 
production in the Ukraine and Russia is mainly for domestic use, much of the 
production from Kazakhstan  and the Uzbekistan is for export as it provides an 
important source of currency for export. The four main producers in Africa, Niger, 
Namibia, South Africa and Gabon contributed less than 105 of supply in 2001. 
  
2.3 Near term uranium supply 
2.3.1 ‘Low Growth’ scenario  
Under the ‘Low Growth’ scenario demand for uranium is forecast to remain flat in the 
near term until 2005 at around 61,000 tonnes per year (Figure 10). Primary uranium 
supply is expected to supply up to 65% of total demand with secondary sources 
supplying 35% (Figure 11). The decline in the relative proportion on secondary 
supplies reflects    89 
Figure 8: Leading Uranium Producers in 2001 
 Source: IAEA 2002 
 
the expected gradual drawdown of stocks, which have to be made up with higher 
levels of primary production. 
 
Under such benign circumstances there are not expected to be any supply constraints. 
With no increase in demand, the 9000 tonnes of capacity that is currently mothballed 
is unlikely to be brought back into production especially as several new projects under 
development are nearing completion in Canada (at McArthur River) and Australia (at 
Beverly, Honeymoon and Jalibuka). As these projects come into production, there is 
likely to be small surplus of supply. 
 
2.3.2 ‘High Growth’ scenario 
Under the ‘High Growth’ scenario demand for uranium is expected to rise to around 
65,000 tonnes per year by 2005 (Figure 12). The 4000 tonnes per year increase can 
easily be met by increasing production from the Australian projects referred to above 
as well as the potential re-opening of capacity that is currently mothballed. 
Mothballed production can take as little a 12 months to be brought back on stream and 
at present there is global spare capacity capable of producing up to 9000 tonnes per 
year (Figure 13). Nearly 75 per cent of this spare capacity lies in Canada, the United 
States and Australia (Figure 14). 
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Figure 9: Historical Production and IAEA Estimates of Future Production (1000 
tonnes U per year). 
 
Source: IAEA 2002 
 
COUNTRY 1998 1999 2000 2001 2005e 2020e 2040e
Argentina 7.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Australia 4894.0 5984.0 7579.0 7700.0 9000.0 21600.0 19600.0
Belgium 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brazil 0.0 0.0 80.0 250.0 250.0 250.0 100.0
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Canada 10922.0 8214.0 10683.0 11250.0 12500.0 11300.0 8800.0
China 590.0 700.0 380.0 380.0 1380.0 1380.0 1380.0
Congo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 610.0 612.0 507.0 501.0 450.0 200.0 0.0
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France 452.0 416.0 296.0 120.0 100.0 50.0 0.0
Gabon 725.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Germany 30.0 29.0 28.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 207.0 207.0 207.0 207.0 207.0 150.0 100.0
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kazakhstan 1270.0 1560.0 1870.0 2250.0 2300.0 2600.0 9400.0
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mongolia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Namibia 2780.0 2690.0 2715.0 2702.0 3000.0 4000.0 5600.0
Niger 3714.0 2907.0 2911.0 2910.0 3000.0 3300.0 4100.0
Pakistan 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Portugal 19.0 10.0 14.0 10.0 8.0 0.0 0.0
Romania 132.0 89.0 86.0 85.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Russian Federation 2530.0 2610.0 2760.0 2910.0 3200.0 3800.0 3800.0
Slovenia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
South Africa 965.0 927.0 838.0 1160.0 1300.0 1800.0 7700.0
Spain 255.0 255.0 255.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ukraine 1000.0 1000.0 1000.0 1000.0 1000.0 1000.0 2500.0
United States 1810.0 1773.0 1522.0 1077.0 2200.0 9400.0 7200.0
Uzbekistan 1926.0 2159.0 2028.0 2350.0 2500.0 3800.0 3800.0
Yugoslavia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 34886 32179 35792 36945 42405 64630 74080  91 
Figure 10: Supply Demand Forecast under the ‘Low Growth’ Scenario (1000 tonnes 
per year) 
 
Source: IAEA 2002 and OIES Estimates 
 
Figure 11: Primary and Secondary Uranium Supply under the ‘Low Growth’ Scenario 
 
 
Source: IAEA 2002 and OIES Estimates 
 
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Demand 61600 61600 61600 61600 61600 58520 55594 52814 50174
HEU 5400 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 6000 0
Supplier Inventory 5550 3000 3000 3000 1500 0 0 0 0
Russian Inventory 7100 3000 900 0 0 0 0 0 0
MOX 1900 2500 3000 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600
Reprocessed U 1400 1500 2000 2000 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
Tails Reprocessing 4500 3650 2350 0 0 0 0 0 0
Market based production 35750 41950 44350 47000 48000 46420 43494 40714 44074
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Source: IAEA 2002 and OIES Estimates 
 
Figure 13: Leading Uranium Producers and Spare Capacity in 2001 
 
 







2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Demand 61600 64800 68100 71500 83300 95000 116000 130000 145000
HEU 5400 10600 12400 11900 11900 0 0 0 0
Supplier Inventory 5550 8210 1867 0 0 0 0 0 0
Russian Inventory 7100 3000 900 0 0 0 0 0 0
MOX 1900 2500 3000 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600
Reprocessed U 1400 1500 2000 2000 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
Tails Reprocessing 4500 3650 2350 0 0 0 0 0 0
Market based production 35792 42405 43200 56659 64630 72000 82900 77000 74080
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Figure 14: Distribution of Spare Capacity in 2001 (1000 tonnes per year) 
Source: IAEA 2002 and OIES Estimates 
 
2.4 Medium term supply of uranium 
2.4.1 ‘Low Growth’ scenario 
Under then ‘Low Growth’ scenario demand for uranium is expected to remain flat 
until 2020 with no incremental demand for new nuclear generation.  Under such a 
scenario, primary uranium is forecast to make up over 75 per cent of primary supply 
with secondary sources accounting for just 25 per cent (Figure 15). The reduction in 
secondary supplies by 2020 is due to the complete drawdown of Russian inventories 
by that time and exhaustion of ‘tails ‘ reprocessing.   
 
Under the ‘Low Growth’ scenario, primary uranium production would have to 
increase to around 48000 tonnes per year, a 10 per cent increase over primary 
production today (Figure 10). Such an increase can easily be met by current 
mothballed production as well as the new Canadian and Australian projects currently 
under development. Analysis of the resource base suggests that the expected primary 
production of around 65000 tonnes per year can be recoverable at costs of between 
$35 and $45 per kg. 
 
2.4.2 ‘High Growth’ scenario 
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We have adopted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) optimistic demand 
estimates for the ‘High Growth’ scenario. Such estimates assume that demand for 
nuclear  
power will rise as greater efforts are made to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and 
there is greater concern over security of supply. Under such circumstances, the IAEA 
estimates that demand for uranium could rise to around 83300 tonnes per year by 
2020, a 30 per cent increase over present day demand.  
 
The IEA estimates suggest that the quantity of secondary uranium supplied from 
inventory held by utilities and commercial suppliers will decline sharply over the next 
15 years. In part this decline can be partially offset by increasing use of Russian and 
US highly enriched uranium, but inevitably increases in primary capacity will be 
required. 
 
Given that the lead times for the development of new projects can be between ten and 
fifteen years from discovery to the start of production capacity and investment 
decisions must be taken soon to ensure supply meets demand. Assuming that the 
industry will gradually adopt market-based principles and that increases in production 
will only take place in those countries where investment can be economically justified 
then it is likely that capacity increases will first take place in Australia, the United 
States and Canada where low cost supplies are plentiful. Estimates of supply by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggest that by 2020 Australia and 
Canada will contribute over half of the world uranium output with capacity in 
Australia set to rise to 21600 tonnes per year and to double in the US (Figure 9). 
Analysis of the resource base suggests that the expected primary production of around 
83000 tonnes per year can be recoverable at costs of between $45 and $60 per kg.  
 
2.5 Long term supply of uranium 
2.5.1 ‘Low Growth’ scenario 
Under the ‘Low Growth’ scenario the long-term demand for uranium is set to decline 
after 2020 as nuclear power stations are decommissioned. Under such circumstances, 
primary supply of uranium would have to contract by some 10 per cent between 2020 
and 2040 in order to prevent the market from becoming oversupplied. Under such 
circumstances it is unlikely that non-OECD supplies would increase in importance as   95 
the resource base in the Australia, Canada and the US could easily cope with the 
benign demand environment. Inventories of secondary uranium are forecast to have 
been completely drawn down with secondary supplies coming solely from MOX and 
reprocessed uranium.   
 
2.5.2 ‘High Growth’ scenario 
 We have adopted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) optimistic 
demand estimates for the ‘High Growth’ scenario. Such estimates assume that 
demand for nuclear power will rise as greater efforts are made to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions, there is greater concern over security of supply and that 
dependence on oil will fall after 2025. Under such circumstances, the IAEA estimates 
that demand for uranium could rise to around 145000 tonnes per year by 2040, a 120 
per cent increase over present day demand.  
 
Analysis of the resource base suggests that primary production of up to 75000 tonnes 
per year can be recoverable at costs of between $80 and $130 per kg. Incremental 
uranium production between 2020 and 2040 is set to come from Kazakhstan, South 
Africa and the Ukraine with capacity in nearly all other countries remaining stable. 
Secondary sources of uranium are not expected to be of significance by 2040. 
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Figure 15: Supply Demand Balance under the ‘High Growth’ Scenario (1000 tonnes 
per year) 
 
Source: IAEA 2002 and OIES Estimates 
 
Figure 16: Supply Demand Balances Showing the Major Exporting and Importing 
Countries. 
 

































































































































































U  97 
However, the significant increase in demand means that a supply gap will open up 
after 2025, which can only be filled with higher cost resources (Figure 15). 
Examination of the resource base suggests that these supplies are available in non-
OECD countries such as Kazakhstan, Namibia, Brazil, Uzbekistan, Mongolia and 
Niger. However, the cost of developing these resources could in some cases be higher 
than $130 per kg.  
 
3. Potential supply disruptions 
In 2001, the key exporting countries for primary uranium were Canada, Australia, 
Niger, Namibia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and South Africa (Figure 16). In this section, 
we focus our attention on the potential supply disruptions that could occur paying 
particular attention to these seven major exporting countries.  
 
We have summarised the likelihood of supply disruptions on the ‘Low Growth’ and 
‘High Growth’ scenarios on Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Summary of the Risks of Supply Disruption 
Source: OIES 
 
3.1 Economic impacts 
3.1.1 Potential size of disruption 
There are two potential disruptions due to economic factors, the long term impact of 
low uranium prices on investment and the near term impact of potential supply 
disruptions to secondary sources of uranium.  
 
At present, the decline in uranium prices to around $30 per kg has occurred because 
of the sale of secondary supplies of uranium. This has meant that the global imbalance 
between production and consumption of primary uranium has had little effect on 
prices. If there were to be a major disruption of supplies of secondary uranium this 
  Home Best
  Near Medium Long Near Medium Long
Economic Low Low Moderate Low Moderate High
Political Low Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Moderate
Institutional Low Low Low Low Low Low
Technical Low Low Low Low Low Moderate  98 
would lead to a shortfall in supply of 35 per cent by 2005.  Such a shortfall would lead 
to a major increase in the uranium price. 
 
Supplies of secondary uranium are expected to be depleted in 15 to 20 years but if 
prices remain at current levels there is little incentive for producers to undertake major 
exploration or development work. Prices must rise to ensure that ongoing exploration 
and development can take place. If not this could lead to severe supply disruption later 
in the long-term as the average lead-time to develop new resources is around 10 to 15 
years from the time of discovery to first production. 
 
The potential impact of low uranium prices is not likely to be felt in the near or 
medium term as the amount of mothballed capacity in OECD countries such as 
Canada, the United States and Australia and is sufficient to meet demand without 
major new investment. The potential size of disruption in the long term very much 
depends of the level of future demand. In the ‘Low Growth’ scenario, demand will not 
require major new investment. However, in the ‘High Growth’ scenario the significant 
amount of new capacity required by 2040 to cover the growing gap between supply 
and demand will require major investment decisions to be taken. Non-OECD 
countries, such a Kazakhstan, are expected to provide most of the incremental 
production capacity after 2020.   
 
The real impact of the low uranium prices has been felt in many of the non-OECD 
countries where the cost structure in the existing industry is relatively high. In 
Namibia, Niger and Kazakhstan the industry is now struggling to cut costs in 
relatively inefficient industries. In Namibia major new deposits have been discovered 
but development will require a sustained upturn in uranium prices. Similarly in 
Kazakhstan new with its vast uranium resource base the current uranium price makes 
most of the deposits uneconomic at the present time.  
 
3.1.2 Potential likelihood of occurrence 
The near term likelihood of a supply disruption to secondary supplies as a result of 
economic impacts is unlikely to occur as it is in the interest of the countries and 
companies to run down the very high inventories to much lower levels. Under both 
the ‘Low Growth’ and ‘High Growth’ scenarios the inventory draw down is likely to   99 
take between 10 and 15 years. If there is any supply disruption it is likely to be more 
temporary than permanent. 
 
Of greater concern is the impact of low prices on future investment. Under the ‘Low 
Growth’ scenario the lack of investment is unlikely to lead to any major disruption to 
supplies and the demand can be met by increased capacity that is already under 
construction. However, under the ‘High Growth’ scenario there has to be real concern 
of a supply shortfall after 2025 if prices do not rise.  
 
3.2 Geopolitical impacts 
3.2.1 Potential size of disruption 
In order to ensure regular and reliable supply, many countries have sought to avoid 
over dependence on any one single source of uranium, particularly as in the near term 
the world market is relying on secondary sources of uranium to satisfy demand. Any 
extended shortfall in secondary sources could destabilise the uranium market and lead 
to potential temporary shortfalls and significant upward pressure on prices.  
 
The EU has encouraged users to maintain a portfolio of diversified, long-term 
contracts with primary producers and to limit reliance on secondary sources. Japan 
also ensures a stable supply of uranium through long-term contracts and by direct 
participation in foreign mining countries. The focus on primary resources is of great 
near term importance, as political decisions will strongly affect the market for 
secondary uranium over the next 20 years. These include the conversion of weapons 
grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) to civilian use, US and EU restrictions on the 
sale of uranium produced in countries of the FSU, and the sale of US stockpiles of 
uranium. In addition, although uranium production in the FSU is known tom have 
exceeded civilian and military requirements over the past 40 years, there is little 
information on the size of the remaining stockpiles. 
 
Environmental issues are also gaining greater importance. This is very apparent from 
the number of countries that are now reporting environmental cost information and 
activities. Although most of these reports focus on decommissioning and reclamation 
of inactive sites, there is increasing awareness of ongoing environmental-related   100 
issues, particularly in OECD countries. For example in Australia, the Jalibuka project 
is currently under investigation as it lies close to a World Heritage site  
 
In countries such as the US and Canada environmental awareness not only relates to 
ongoing reclamation but also to the whole nuclear energy debate. This could affect 
permission to re-open mothballed plant but more importantly permission to develop 
Greenfield sites. In its extreme, the anti-nuclear lobby could try and target the source 
of suppliers of uranium rather than the consumers of uranium in order to achieve their 
objective of closing the nuclear industry. If such a lobby group were to gain political 
acceptance in the US and Canada, this could pose a threat to the two of the larger 
suppliers of primary uranium.   
 
Environmental problems in the non-OECD countries result in slightly different supply 
concerns. Kazakhstan has significant environmental problems as a result of previous 
ownership issues. Contamination of groundwater in the major production areas has 
led to the development of an exclusion zone around most sites where extraction of 
drinking water is prohibited. In addition, uranium and ore processing centres have left 
behind significant volumes of low-level radioactive waste. As no financial provisions 
were made to clear this waste the Republic of Kazakhstan must provide the funding. 
While these environmental problems remain foreign investors are reluctant to invest 
in new capacity, as they do not wish to be exposed to any historical environmental 
liabilities. The issue of liability for historical environmental liabilities is a major 
disincentive for foreign investment.  
 
Geopolitical disruptions have had a greater impact in non-OECD countries. In 
Namibia, the effect of political uncertainty caused the rapid curtailment of exploration 
work by foreign investors in the early 1980s just when refinement of exploration 
techniques had led to the discovery of a major new deposit in Namib Desert. 
 
3.2.2 Potential likelihood of occurrence 
The likelihood of politically induced supply disruptions will vary according to 
whether it is politically or environmentally induced. 
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Political decisions concerning the release of secondary stockpiles of uranium could 
cause massive disruptions to supply but such decisions are unlikely as it is not in the 
interest of most producing countries to induce major price instability. Secondary 
sources of uranium are more likely to be disrupted by environmental groups who are 
seeking to disrupt supplies to the nuclear industry. In such cases, the supply disruption 
is only likely to be localised and temporary. 
 
Of greater concern in the long-term is the increasing influence of anti-nuclear lobby 
groups. At its extreme these lobby groups could influence the development decisions 
for new sites, particularly in Canada, the USA and Australia, and this would have a 
serious impact on longer-term supply. The influence of such lobby groups in the near 
and medium term is not considered to be a major threat. 
 
The reticence of private companies to invest in non-OECD countries is likely unless 
guarantees can be made that exclude them from any historical environmental 
liabilities. In the longer term such guarantees are likely to be forthcoming as mining 
can be a major source of foreign income. However, given the lead-time for new 
developments the likely impact on supply disruption is set to grow from being low in 
the near-term to relatively high in the longer term. 
 
Given that most of the primary supply in the near and medium-term is set to come 
from OECD countries, the threat of supply disruption due political instability or civil 
war is low. However, in the longer term increasing reliance on non-OECD supplies, 
particularly after 2020 could increase the risk to supplies. 
 
3.3 Institutional impacts 
3.3.1 Potential size of disruption  
There are no real cartels operating within the uranium industry. A number of supply 
restrictions have been in place to prevent dumping of cheap uranium. For example 
from 1991 to 1999 the US restricted imports of uranium from the former Soviet 
Union. However all such restrictions have now been lifted.  
 
Elsewhere restrictions on production have been more a result of domestic policy than 
any cartelisation. Production was restricted in Australia up until 1996 as a result of a   102 
policy, which restricted uranium production (‘three mines policy’). The removal of 
this policy means that new developments are now possible although they will still be 
subject to stringent environmental, heritage and nuclear safeguards. 
 
Under the current two tier market structure it is not possible for any major cartel to 
form. Not only are there diverse sources of supply of primary uranium but also there 
are also diverse sources of secondary uranium. There have been discussions between 
various countries to explore the possibility of restricting the sale of secondary 
uranium into the market in order to support prices but such discussions have come to 
nothing. 
 
3.3.2 Potential likelihood of occurrence 
The likelihood of any supply disruption due to institutional impacts is very low. In the 
near and medium term the source of supply is just too diverse. In the longer term any 
cartel would have to be made up of non-OECD countries such as Namibia, Niger, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This is an unlikely combination and would only occur 
under the ‘High Growth’ scenario with the forecast of high increase in demand. 
 
3.4 Technical impacts 
3.4.1 Potential size of disruption 
The fall in uranium prices over recent years combined with the surplus in supplies has 
meant that expenditures on total global uranium exploration have fallen sharply. 
Worldwide exploration expenditures in 2000 totalled just $87 million down from a 
high of $178 million in 1997 and the figure for 2001 was expected to fall to around 
$55 million (Figure 18). Increases in exploration budgets have been recorded in 
Canada, Australia, the US, Russia and India but in general expenditures on domestic 
exploration were some ten times higher than expenditure on exploration abroad. In 
addition, exploration in Canada and the US accounted for over 50 per cent of the total 
budget in 2001. Such a decrease in exploration could be of concern in the longer term. 
 
In contrast, technological developments in the nuclear power industry could adversely 
affect demand for uranium. New reprocessing technologies could reduce demand for 
uranium by some 17% over the next 20 years (IAEA 2001). Other technologies under 
development could also make a difference. These include fast breeder reactors, high-   103 
Figure 18: Worldwide Uranium Exploration Expenditure (1994-2002) 
 
Source: IAEA 2002 
 
temperature gas-cooled reactors and new enrichment technologies that could extend 
uranium resources for centuries (IAEA 2001).   
 
3.4.2 Potential likelihood of occurrence 
Supply disruptions due to technical factors are only expected to be of importance in 
the long-term. Sufficient new reserves have been discovered to meet near and 
medium-term demand forecasts under both the ‘High Growth’ and ‘Low Growth’ 
scenarios. However, there are insufficient low cost reserves to meet long-term demand 
forecasts under the ‘High Growth’ scenario and this could lead to supply disruptions 
unless new exploration is undertaken in the next few years. 
 
However, the impacts of low-levels of exploration are likely to be mitigated by 
improvements in efficiency in the nuclear industry making the likelihood of supply 
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4. Affect on prices of supply disturbances 
The price assumptions for the ‘Low Growth’ and ‘High Growth’ scenarios are shown 
in Figure 19. In the ‘Low Growth’ scenario prices are expected to remain relatively 
depressed as demand for uranium remains benign. Even so we have assumed that the 
price will rise by around 2 per cent per annum until 2040 reflecting the high cost of 
production of new developments currently being brought on stream. In the ‘High 
Growth’ scenario we forecast prices to rise above $130 by 2040, representing a 5 per 
cent compound annual growth in prices. Such an increase will be necessary to justify 
the development of the more expensive non-OECD deposits required to fill the supply 
gap after 2025. 
 
Figure 19: Price Scenarios 
 
4.1 ‘Low Growth’ scenarios 
Supply disruption in the ‘Low Growth’ scenario are considered to be low in the near 
term. If they do occur then they are likely to be short-lived causing near term price-
spikes. Under such circumstance  we would not foresee average prices rising 
substantially above our current price forecast.  
 
Medium term supply disruptions are also considered to be low although there is a 
moderate chance that environmental factors could disrupt supplies. In such a case we 
would still consider the impact on prices to be relatively short lived as current 
production, developments in progress and secondary supplies are sufficient to meet 
demand. As a result we would not foresee average prices rising significantly above 
our forecast. 
 
In the longer term political factors could put pressure on prices. If decisions are taken 




  Home Best
Near $30 $35
Medium $35-45 $45-60
Long $45-65 >$130  105 
 
4.2 ‘High Growth’ scenarios 
Supply disruption in the ‘High Growth’ scenario are considered to be low in the near 
term. If they do occur then they are likely to be short-lived causing near term price-
spikes. Under such circumstance we would not foresee average prices rising 
substantially above our current price forecast.  
 
In the medium term, there are real economic supply risks if decisions to develop new 
reserves are not made in time given the long lead times in the industry. By 2020 the 
supply of secondary uranium is expected to be exhausted but if such supplies prove to 
be lower than anticipated there will be sustained upward pressure on the price. 
Current estimates of supply suggest that the price will have to rise to between $45 and 
$65 per kg to bring on new supply but if secondary sources run out earlier than 
forecast this would push this price band upwards. 
 
In the long-term the risk of supply disruption duo to political and economic factors is 
estimated to be high to moderate simply because the supply demand gas that opens up 
after 2025 is so wide. The impact of technology on demand is unlikely to be able to 
bridge this gap therefore there is a real risk of upward pressure on prices if new 
developments are not brought on stream on time. 
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Metric units are used in all tabulations and statements. Resources and production 
quantities are expressed in terms of metric tons (t) and uranium (U) rather than 
uranium oxide (U3O8). 
 
1 short ton U3O8  =  0.769 tU 
    USD/lb U3O8   =  USD 2.6/kgU 
    1 metric ton    =  1 tonne 
 
HEU  Highly enriched uranium (used principally for nuclear weapons and 
fuel) 
MOX  Mixed oxide fuel (fabricated from depleted or natural uranium oxide 
which can be used in standard light water reactors)   107 
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i It is legitimate to ask, why should the focus be on price instead of quantities.  A disruption of 
production or distribution means a reduction in availability.  At first sight this is certainly true.  But the 
severity and the many implications of a quantitative shift can only be gauged by considering the 
resulting price effect, its impact and the behavioural and policy adjustments to this effect.  The true 
measure of a shortage (which is always relative to demand) is the extent of the price change.  And in 
the very extreme case when a commodity entirely vanishes from the market one could still say that the 
price change is of infinite magnitude. 